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INVISIBLE JUSTICES: HOW OUR HIGHEST 
COURT HIDES FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 
Eric J. Segall 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States is one of the least 
transparent governmental institutions in the United States. The 
Justices’ reluctance to show themselves on camera has been debated 
and criticized at length but is only one small part of a more disturbing 
and consistent pattern of secrecy. The Court acts in mysterious ways 
across a broad range of official duties. This Article examines how the 
Court uses that secrecy to hide important aspects of its work from the 
American public. In addition to forbidding cameras in their 
courtroom,1 the Justices follow different and less onerous ethical and 
professional rules than all other federal judges.2 The Justices do not 
have to and almost never explain important recusal decisions even 
when a party has filed an official motion alleging that the Justice is 
                                                                                                                 
  I’d like to thank the students of the Georgia State University Law Review for all of their hard 
work on this paper as well as on the symposium for which it was written (especially Christine Lee and 
Luke Donohue) as well as the participants in that symposium for their comments on an earlier draft. I’d 
also like to thank Professor Lisa McEleroy and journalist Tony Mauro for prior assistance with this 
paper. 
 1. Clerk of Court: Supreme Court of the United States, Guide for Counsel in Cases to be Argued 
Before The Supreme Court of the United States 3 (Oct. 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/guideforcounsel.pdf (stating that lawyers are not allowed to have electronic devices, 
including cameras, in the court room and that “news cameras are not allowed in the [Supreme] Court 
building”); Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
faq_visiting.aspx (last visited Apr. 31, 2016) (noting that “no photography is allowed inside the 
Courtroom at any time” and additionally visitors should “refrain from taking . . . cameras . . . cell 
phones . . . [and] other electronic devices” into the Courtroom when the Court is in session); On 
Cameras in Supreme Court, Souter Says, ‘Over My Dead Body’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 1996), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/03/30/us/on-cameras-in-supreme-court-souter-says-over-my-dead-
body.html (“Justice Souter and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy made it clear that even though Federal 
appeals courts allow cameras to cover proceedings, television will not be allowed in the Supreme Court 
any time soon.”). 
 2. Nancy Smith, What? Accountability for U.S. Supreme Court Justices . . . Finally?, SUNSHINE 
STATE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/what-accountability-
us-supreme-court-justices-finally (stating that Supreme Court Justices should be subject to a code of 
ethics just like all federal judges and describing a bill—the Supreme Court Ethics Act—that has been 
reintroduced in Congress to accomplish that goal); see infra text accompanying notes 185 and 204. 
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biased or has an improper interest in the litigation.3 The Justices have 
no obligation to make their official, taxpayer-funded papers public 
after they leave office.4 The Justices do not even have to disclose 
their individual votes on whether to hear or not hear the very few 
cases they decide to accept to each year.5 
The Justices, no doubt, need their independence to perform their 
jobs, but the Court as an institution does not have to remain a 
mythical and mysterious place shrouded in secrecy and removed 
from meaningful public inspection. There is a general presumption of 
transparency in our democracy that requires strong evidence of harm 
before the government is allowed to act in secret.6 This presumption, 
however, does not apply to our highest court to the shame of the 
Justices, the institution, and ultimately, our democracy. 
I.   CAMERAS 
Going into the last week of June 2015, the Supreme Court of the 
United States was on the verge of handing down blockbuster cases on 
same-sex marriage and the Affordable Care Act.7 Millions of 
Americans waited anxiously for the Justices to interpret the 
Constitution and federal statutory law and answer fundamental 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See Christopher Riffle, Ducking Recusal: Justice Scalia’s Refusal to Recuse Himself from 
Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Colombia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004), and the Need 
for a Unique Recusal Standard for Supreme Court Justices, 84 NEB. L. REV. 650, 667 (2005) 
(“Currently, a Justice’s recusal decision is completely autonomous and definitive. Even if there is some 
question regarding the appropriateness of the Justice’s decision, there is no statutory provision to be 
invoked that would allow such an inquisition.”). 
 4. Eric J. Segall, What Are the Supreme Court Justices Hiding?, L.A. TIMES (May 5, 2014, 11:09 
PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-segall-supreme-court-transparency-20140505-
story.html (arguing that Supreme Court Justices’ papers should be deemed public property, as are the 
papers of other government officials whose “salaries are paid by taxpayers,” after “taking into account 
reasonable privacy concerns”). 
 5. Eric J. Segall, Let’s Lift the Supreme Court’s Veil of Secrecy, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2014, 5:04 
PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-1008-segall-scotus-anonymous-certiorari-20141007-
story.html (arguing that the practice of the Supreme Court not revealing which Justices voted for or 
against hearing a case—unless a Justice writes a dissent—is inconsistent with government transparency 
in a democracy). 
 6. Id. 
 7. See infra notes 8, 11, and accompanying text; see also Richard Wolf, 6 Major Cases Await 
Supreme Court Rulings, USA TODAY (June 25, 2015, 10:11 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
politics/2015/06/25/supreme-court-major-cases-remaining/29106717/l. 
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questions about how we define ourselves as a country. No one (other 
than the Justices) knew on which specific days the Court would hand 
down these decisions (the Justices never inform the public in 
advance), but most everyone knew that the cases were forthcoming. 
Over two dramatic June days, for many, the world changed. Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, a Ronald Reagan appointed Republican from 
California, announced that the Supreme Court had decided by a 
bitterly divided 5–4 vote that same-sex couples have a constitutional 
right to marry just like heterosexual couples.8 Thousands of 
Americans, gay and straight, wept for joy.9 Others, of course, 
believed the decision to be both a tragic mistake and a terrible 
usurpation of power by five Justices.10 
The Supreme Court also announced that the attempt by a few die-
hard objectors to gut the Affordable Care Act would not succeed. By 
a vote of 6–3, the Court rejected the challengers’ bizarre argument 
that federal health exchanges could not offer federal tax subsidies.11 
Millions of Americans would continue to be able to afford health 
insurance. During this same time period, the Court also handed down 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (holding that “the right of same-sex couples 
to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived . . . from that 
Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws” and thus, “the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex”). 
 9. Sebastian Ivory, Today We Celebrate but Tomorrow We Get Back to Work, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 29, 2015, 2:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sebastian-ivory/today-we-celebrate-but-
tomorrow-we-get-back-to-work_b_7674880.html. 
 10. Call to Action Scholars Statement, CAMPAIGN FOR AMERICAN PRINCIPLES, 
https://campaignforamericanprinciples.com/scholars-statement (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (“Because we 
stand with President Lincoln against judicial despotism, we also stand with these distinguished legal 
scholars who are calling on officeholders to reject Obergefell as an unconstitutional effort to usurp the 
authority vested by the Constitution in the people and their representatives. At the same time, we stand 
with the four dissenting Supreme Court justices in Obergefell who rightly noted that the judicially 
imposed redefinition of marriage is a judicial power grab that will—as Justice Alito wrote in his 
dissent—’vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.’”); Judicial Watch on 
Supreme Court’s Ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, JUDICIAL WATCH (June 26, 2015), 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/press-room/press-releases/judicial-watch-statement-on-supreme-courts-
ruling-in-obergefell-v-hodges (“The exercise of raw judicial power by five justices should be resisted 
under law and overturned.”). 
 11. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2484 (2015) (holding that tax credits are available to 
individuals in states that have a Federal Exchange, and stating that “[s]ection 18031(i)(3)(B)’s 
requirement that all Exchanges create outreach programs to ‘distribute fair and impartial information 
concerning . . . the availability of premium tax credits under section 36B’—would make little sense if 
tax credits were not available on Federal Exchanges.”). 
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divided opinions on redistricting, the death penalty, and other 
important issues.12 
No one but a few reporters and about 250 people saw the Court 
announce these decisions.13 C-Span offered to televise the proceeding 
so that those interested could gather around their televisions, tablets, 
and smart phones to observe history, but the Justices refused that 
request.14 
There will never be any video or even photographic evidence of 
these historic cases. When law professors teach these cases to future 
generations of students, neither will be able to see how proud Justice 
Kennedy was to provide equal rights to gay Americans or how 
Justice Roberts turned away a politically inspired challenge to 
President Obama’s signature legislation.15 Truly historic 
governmental business was transacted largely in private away from 
the American people. 
There are compelling reasons to televise Supreme Court 
proceedings, both the oral arguments and the decision days, and few 
persuasive objections to keep them off the air. It is well past time the 
Supreme Court enters modern times and joins most of the states as 
well as the supreme courts of Canada, Brazil, and the United 
Kingdom, and allow live television coverage of its official business.16 
A.   The Arguments For and Against Cameras 
The first argument in favor of cameras in the Supreme Court is a 
simple one: The oral arguments and decision days are already public 
events, C-Span is willing to televise them at its own expense, and 
there are obviously many Americans who want to witness the 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Wolf, supra note 7. 
 13. Visiting the Court, SUPREME CT. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/htcw_ 
visiting.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (“The public seating capacity is approximately 250; but for the 
most dramatic cases and special occasions there is never enough room.”). 
 14. Judge Steve Leben & Judge Kevin S. Burke, Supreme Court Itself Will Be Tested as it Hears 
Health-Case Arguments, MINN POST: COMMUNITY VOICES (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.minnpost.com 
/community-voices/2012/03/supreme-court-itself-will-be-tested-it-hears-health-case-arguments. 
 15. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. 
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 16. Kyu H. Youm, Cameras in the Courtoom in the Twenty-First Century: The U.S. Supreme Court 
Learning From Abroad?, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1989, 1990–92 (2012). 
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proceedings.17 We normally have a strong presumption that open 
government hearings will be, well, open. As Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky has written: “Supreme Court proceedings, of course, 
are government events and there should be a strong presumption that 
people should be able to watch government proceedings. Arguments 
in the Supreme Court always have been open to the public, but 
relatively few can attend in person.”18 
In addition to the normal presumption of transparency, there are a 
myriad of cultural, educational, historical, and civic benefits to 
allowing cameras at the Supreme Court. The American people could 
watch lawyers and judges argue over our most controversial, 
divisive, and sometimes partisan issues, with mutual respect, civility, 
and deference. Especially in these overly partisan times, the oral 
arguments could set an example of how public officials can disagree, 
sometimes bitterly, without undue rancor. 
Our national museums could display the Court’s most important 
cases with the Justices on video arguing over the issues and 
announcing the results. Students in elementary and secondary 
schools, colleges, and law schools could gain better insight and 
understanding about the Court and great historical debates over race 
relations, abortion, gun control, and voting rights by actually seeing 
the Justices perform their duties. Perhaps most importantly, when the 
Court hands down landmark decisions like last term’s same-sex 
marriage opinion, millions of Americans could gather together in a 
moment of national pride (or anguish) and political engagement 
which would be markedly different from hearing the news second 
hand from a few select journalists. 
Balanced against all of those benefits are a few unpersuasive 
arguments the Justices routinely trot out against cameras in the Court. 
Perhaps the most famous statement made by a Justice opposing 
cameras was Justice David Souter’s admonition that “the day you see 
a camera come into our courtroom, it’s going to roll over my dead 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, Time to Televise Supreme Court Proceedings, ORANGE CO. 
REG. (Mar. 19 2014), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/court-606042-arguments-supreme.html. 
 18. Id. 
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body.”19 Souter explained that he was concerned that statements 
made during oral arguments could be taken out of context by the 
media and that the “judiciary is not a political institution . . . nor is it 
part of the entertainment industry.”20 
Justice Souter’s concern that cameras should not be allowed 
because the Court is not a “political institution” is particularly 
revealing. Although the political or legal nature of the Court’s 
decision-making is beyond the scope of this paper, one does not have 
to be a core legal realist to appreciate that the Justices make 
fundamentally important decisions about many of our country’s most 
controversial issues based largely on vague text, contested history, 
and precedents that can be interpreted in many different ways.21 
Justice Souter’s vehement opposition to cameras was probably based 
on his desire to maintain the Court’s image as an apolitical font of 
law rather than a values laden (and at least somewhat if not mostly 
political) institution. 
Other Justices have also expressed concern that the media might 
distort out-of-context snippets of Court proceedings if cameras were 
allowed in the Courtroom.22 For example, testifying in front of 
Congress on the Court’s budget, Justice Stephen Breyer said, “If you 
see on television a person taking a picture of you and really 
mischaracterizing [what you say], the first time you see that, the next 
day you’ll watch a lot more carefully what you say. Now that’s 
what’s worrying me.”23 
Dean Chemerinsky once again has provided a persuasive response: 
I have heard justices express concern that if television 
cameras were allowed, the media might broadcast excerpts 
that offer a misleading impression of arguments and the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. On Cameras in Supreme Court, supra note 1. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See generally ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A COURT 
AND ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012). 
 22. See Tal Kopan, At Sequestration Hearing, Breyer, Kennedy Say Cameras in the Courtroom Too 
Risky, POLITICO (Mar. 14, 2013, 12:59 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/03/at-
sequestration-hearing-breyer-kennedy-say-cameras-in-the-courtroom-too-risky-159328. 
 23. Id. 
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court. But that is true when any government proceeding is 
taped or even when reporters cover any event. A newspaper 
or television reporter could quote a justice’s question or a 
lawyer’s answer out of context. The Supreme Court should 
not be able to protect itself from misreporting any more 
than any other government institution can do so. 
 
The justices might be afraid that an excerpt of oral 
arguments might be used for entertainment purposes; 
perhaps they will even be mocked. But that is a cost of 
being a democratic society and of holding a prominent 
position in government. In no other context would Supreme 
Court justices say that government officials can protect 
themselves from possible criticism by cutting off public 
access.24 
Some Justices have expressed fears that their fellow Justices, 
lawyers, or both may misbehave and grandstand if cameras were 
allowed in the Supreme Court.25 For example, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy has said that with cameras there may be an “insidious 
temptation to think that one of my colleagues is trying to get a sound 
bite for the television” and that would “alter the way in which we 
hear our cases, the way in which we talk to each other, the way in 
which we use that precious hour.”26 How the Justices behave, 
however, is in their own control and not an excuse to hide their 
official public duties from the American people. To the extent there 
is concern over lawyers misbehaving, the Justices are more than 
capable of preventing lawyers from playing to the cameras in an 
inappropriate manner.27 
Perhaps the strongest (yet still not persuasive) objection to cameras 
in the Supreme Court is that the public may perceive or come to 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Chemerinsky, supra note 17. 
 25. Kristin Linsley Myles et al., Supreme Court Watch: Cameras in the Courtroom?, 38 S.F. ATT’Y 
MAG. 49, 51 (2012), https://www.sfbar.org/forms/sfam/q22012/scw-cameras-in-the-courtroom.pdf. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
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believe that oral arguments play a larger and more significant role in 
the Justices’ final decisions than they actually do.28 Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor, one of many Justices who was more open-minded about 
cameras during her confirmation hearings than after ascending to the 
bench, has said that televising oral arguments “could be more 
misleading than helpful . . . . It’s like reading tea leaves.”29 Justice 
Antonin Scalia argued that televising oral arguments would present a 
misleading view of the Court both because oral arguments account 
for little of what the Court actually does and snippets of the 
arguments would be taken out of context.30 
None of these arguments, however, apply in the least to the 
dramatic June decision days when the Justices do nothing more than 
announce their decisions in nationally watched cases. There, the 
Justices completely control the message they want to send and how 
much or little information they provide to the public. 
Moreover, it is not up to government officials to decide what 
already public information should be shared with the public. If the 
American people overstate the importance of oral arguments or take 
“snippets” out of context, the Justices have many different ways to 
correct those misapprehensions.31 Additionally, keeping the 
arguments secret and hidden away might in fact give them an 
importance out of proportion to their actual relevance.32 If the 
arguments are not that important, what is the harm of putting them on 
television for all the world to see? 
The Justices make the transcripts and audio recordings of oral 
arguments available for public inspection.33 But for new generations 
of young Americans raised on YouTube and iPhones, live streaming 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Sam Baker, Justice Sotomayor no Longer Backs Television Cameras in Supreme Court, THE 
HILL (Feb. 7, 2013, 7:25 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/news/281765-sotomayor-no-longer-backs-
cameras-in-supreme-court. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Stephanie Condon, Scalia: Cameras in the Court Will “Miseducate” People, CBS NEWS (July 
26, 2012, 11:37 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/scalia-cameras-in-the-court-will-miseducate-
people. 
 31. Gabe Roth, Why Doesn’t the Supreme Court have Cameras?, MSNBC (July 25, 2015, 9:41 
AM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/why-doesnt-the-supreme-court-have-cameras. 
 32. See Condon, supra note 30. 
 33. Myles et.al., supra note 25. 
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and television coverage of important news events is the most 
important information currency.34 
Numerous state courts and other countries have allowed cameras 
in their courtrooms for a long time with overwhelmingly positive 
results.35 For example, Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor of the Ohio 
Supreme Court has written essays and op-eds supporting the use of 
cameras in Ohio courtrooms and recounting the beneficial positive 
effects of cameras in the courtrooms.36 Her conclusion is that “the 
objective evidence is persuasive that open, transparent courtrooms—
including broadcast proceedings with reasonable restrictions—
support public understanding of the courts and foster trust and 
confidence in the judicial system.”37 
Over forty states now allow use of cameras, video streaming, or 
both throughout their systems including in their supreme courts.38 
The O.J. Simpson case notwithstanding,39 there have been few 
complaints about the use of cameras with judges and lawyers saying 
their presence does not adversely affect the proceedings.40 In 
addition, the high courts of Canada, the United Kingdom, and Brazil 
also televise their proceedings.41 All three countries report positive 
experiences.42 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Doug Gross, Survey: More Americans Get News from Internet than Newspapers or Radio, 
CNN (Mar. 1, 2010, 12:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/03/01/social.network.news/ 
index.html. 
 35. Cameras in the Courtroom, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 
http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/digital-journalists-legal-guide/cameras-courtrooms 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2016); S.M. Oliva, Put Cameras in the Supreme Court, REASON.COM (Apr. 13, 
2014, 12:00 PM), https://reason.com/archives/2014/04/13/put-cameras-in-the-supreme-court/print; see 
infra notes 38−42 and accompanying text. 
 36. E.g., Maureen O’Connor, Cameras Do Belong in the Courtroom, WASH. POST (July 18, 2013), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/cameras-do-belong-in-the-courtroom/2013/07/18/e4bc45bc-
ee2f-11e2-bb32-725c8351a69e_story.html. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Utah Joins States with Courts Open to Cameras, RADIO TELEVISION DIG. NEWS ASSOC. (Mar. 
28, 2013, 1:30 PM), http://www.rtdna.org/article/utah_joins_states_with_courts_open_to_cameras. 
 39. See Times Editorial Board, Another Casualty of the O.J. Trial: Cameras in Courtrooms, L.A. 
TIMES (June 11, 2014, 8:08 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-oj-20140611-
story.html. 
 40. Ronald D. Rotunda, Cameras in the Supreme Court, VERDICT (Nov. 9, 2015), 
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/11/09/cameras-in-the-supreme-court. 
 41. Youm, supra note 16, at 1990. 
 42. See id. at 2005–31. 
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While all of this progress is being made elsewhere, the Supreme 
Court of the United States is resisting this trend of openness and 
transparency. In his 2014 Year End Report, which was “embargoed” 
as usual until 6:00 p.m. on New Year’s Eve, Chief Justice John 
Roberts tried to make the case that the Court has historically and 
appropriately been slow to embrace new technology. Chief Justice 
Roberts explained his views in the Year End Report: 
Under our constitutional scheme, the courts are neutral 
arbiters of concrete disputes that rely on parties with 
genuine grievances to initiate the process and frame the 
issues for decision. The courts’ passive and circumscribed 
role directly affects how courts deploy information 
technology. The courts understandably focus on those 
innovations that, first and foremost, advance their primary 
goal of fairly and efficiently adjudicating cases through the 
application of law.43 
The controversial premise of this rather opaque argument, that the 
Justices are “neutral arbiters” who play a “passive and 
circumscribed” role in our “constitutional scheme,” sounds a lot like 
the famous “umpire” analogy Chief Justice Roberts set out during his 
confirmation hearing.44 But, as the author of Shelby County v. 
Holder45 and of the concurrence in Citizens United v. FEC,46 two 
controversial and powerful exercises of the judicial power, Chief 
Justice Roberts should know better. Polls show the Court losing favor 
with the American people, who are becoming increasingly skeptical 
that politics are not significantly involved in the Court’s decisions.47 
                                                                                                                 
 43. CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., YEAR END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2014), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2014year-endreport.pdf. 
 44. Id.; Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
 45. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2617 (2013). 
 46. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010). 
 47. Nick Gass, Poll: Disapproval of Supreme Court Reaches New High, POLITICO (Oct. 2, 2015, 
8:50 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/poll-supreme-court-approval-rating-214363. 
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There may have been a time when the Justices remaining mysterious 
and out of the public eye helped perpetuate the “neutral arbiter” myth 
but with the advent of the internet, iPhones, and computer tablets of 
every variety the people can now see their leaders in many different 
ways on a variety of different mediums.48 The secrecy that Chief 
Justice Roberts believes breeds confidence now likely produces 
suspicion. 
No one is asking the Court to thoughtlessly embrace brand new 
technology that may implicate security, administrative, or privacy 
concerns. The call is for the Justices to allow C-Span to cover already 
public hearings where the Court performs its basic functions: hearing 
oral arguments and announcing its decisions.49 Vague and 
unsubstantiated fears of lawyer or Justice showboating or possible 
public misperception of the nature of these already open proceedings 
should not deprive the American people of access to their 
government.50 The Court should allow cameras into all of its 
proceedings where members of the public are invited. Anything less 
than allowing that full coverage suggests that the Justices are hiding 
from the very people they are supposed to work for and who pay 
their salaries. That is no way to run our country’s highest Court. 
II.   RECUSAL 
On January 10, 2014, the Supreme Court announced that Justice 
Samuel Alito was recused from an important case involving the 
streaming of free television programs.51 This information came in the 
form of a simple statement alongside the granting of the writ of 
certiorari that stated: “Justice Alito took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this petition.”52 
                                                                                                                 
 48. ROBERTS supra note 43. 
 49. See Chemerinsky, supra note 17. 
 50. Rotunda, supra note 40. 
 51. WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3403 
(U.S. Jan. 10, 2014) (No. 13-461). 
 52. Id. 
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No reasons were given, but the implications for the large television 
networks that brought the suit were significant because, with Alito 
recused, a four-to-four tie vote would have meant the lower court 
decision would be affirmed and the networks would lose the case.53 
Although officially there was no way to know why Alito recused 
himself, the best guess was that he owned stocks in one or more of 
the companies involved in the case.54 The mere fact that we have to 
guess at such an important decision demonstrates the lack of 
transparency in the Court’s recusal process. 
On April 16, 2014, the Supreme Court announced in a routine 
entry on its docket that “Justice Alito is no longer recused in this 
case.”55 Again, Justice Alito provided no reason for this decision.56 
The speculation was that he had sold the stock that he likely held in 
one or more of the companies.57 This change had significant 
implications for the case because now a four-to-four tie vote was no 
longer possible. 
We never learned why Justice Alito first recused himself in the 
case and suddenly, on the eve of oral argument, did not, but he 
should have explained his mysterious change of heart. If he had a 
sincere, neutral desire to make sure a full Court could hear the case 
that would seem to be a legitimate reason, but what if the change was 
prompted by his desire to make sure one of the parties in the case 
would win? That motivation seems far less appropriate. Moreover, a 
federal judge who decides to sell stock in a company so that he can 
sit on a case may defer the capital gains if he reinvests in certain 
government-approved instruments.58 There is nothing wrong with 
this incentive to sit on a case, but it arguably makes it even more 
                                                                                                                 
 53. WNET Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom, ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, 
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014). 
 54. Lyle Denniston, Alito Rejoins the Court in Two Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 16, 2014, 5:15 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/alito-rejoins-the-court-in-two-cases. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.; see also Jonathan Handel, Justice Alito Rejoins Aereo Supreme Court Case, HOLLYWOOD 
REP. (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/justice-alito-rejoins-aereo-supreme-
696950. 
 58. Marianna Bettman, Judicial “Unrecusal”, LEGALLY SPEAKING OH. (Jan. 6, 2012), 
http://www.legallyspeakingohio.com/2012/01/judicial-%E2%80%9Cunrecusal%E2%80%9D. 
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important to know why the Justices sometimes recuse, why they do 
not, and most importantly, why they sometimes change their minds 
right before the case is argued. 
The law of recusal is essential for the rule of law to function 
effectively.59 Judges deciding cases and controversies must be 
impartial and unbiased.60 This age-old idea of judicial fairness can be 
traced back to Roman times.61 Without fair judges, there can be no 
justice.62 
In this country, since 1792, Congress has required federal judges 
to recuse themselves from hearing any case in which they have a 
financial interest or have served as counsel for either party.63 This old 
recusal statute has been amended many times since then in an effort 
to ensure greater judicial impartiality, but is still in place today, 
supported by all of the policy considerations that engendered it in the 
first place.64 If the public does not have a strong belief that judges 
decide cases without bias or personal stake, the public will not have 
confidence in the transparency and fairness of their decisions.65 
Federal laws require all federal judges, including Supreme Court 
Justices, to recuse themselves from deciding cases in a large number 
of situations.66 Although the statute governing recusal is complex, the 
central purpose of the requirements is that the judges should not hear 
cases when they (or immediate family members) have a financial or 
other personal interest in the case, when they have previously 
expressed their views on the outcome of the case, or when they 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform, 38 PEPP. 
L. REV. 1109, 1140 (2011). 
 60. Id. at 1118, 1118 n.70. 
 61. Id. at 1112 (stating a Roman judge could be disqualified before trial on grounds of suspicion). 
The Torah states that bribes or other personal considerations could cloud a judge’s judgment and 
therefore cause a judge to recuse himself. Rabbi Yissocher Frand, Small Favors, TORAH.ORG, 
http://www.torah.org/learning/ravfrand/5772/devarim.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
 62. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 
U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 532 (2005). 
 63. Id. at 539. 
 64. See Louis J. Virelli III, Congress, the Constitution, and Supreme Court Recusal, 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1535, 1545 (2012). 
 65. See Frost, supra note 62, at 532. 
 66. Bias or Prejudice of a Judge, 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012); Disqualification of a Justice, Judge, or 
Magistrate Judge, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012). Section 144 applies only to district court judges while section 
455 applies to all federal judges, including the Supreme Court. Id. 
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served as a lawyer on the case in an official capacity.67 All of these 
requirements are a subset of the first section of the recusal statute that 
is a catch-all provision requiring recusal where a judge’s 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”68 The statute 
measures impartiality through an objective standard that requires 
recusal if a hypothetical reasonable person would find that the 
judge’s impartiality could be questioned.69 
Unfortunately, unlike recusal for lower court judges,70 the law 
applicable to the Supreme Court contains no enforcement 
mechanisms.71 In other words, whether a Supreme Court Justice 
should recuse herself from a case is within the discretion of that 
particular Justice with no required review of that decision at any 
level.72 This exclusive authority has led to controversial and non-
transparent decisions by Supreme Court Justices who refused to 
recuse themselves when the circumstances strongly suggested 
different outcomes.73 
Supreme Court scholars have observed that there are major flaws 
with how the Court decides recusal questions.74 For example, the 
Justices have rarely written public memoranda explaining a decision 
to recuse or not recuse in a particular case.75 This silence is a serious 
threat to the rule of law, the transparency of judicial decision-making, 
and the public’s confidence in the Court. A glaring example of this 
lack of transparency and threat to the rule of law occurred when 
Justice Elena Kagan failed to communicate about her decision not to 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See Virelli, supra note 64, at 1545 n.19. 
 68. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
 69. Marcia G. Robeson, Annotation, Construction and Application of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a) 
Providing for Disqualification of Justice, Judge, Magistrate, or Referee in Bankruptcy in Any 
Proceeding in Which His Partiality Might Reasonably Be Questioned, 40 A.L.R. FED. 954 (1978). 
 70. 28 U.S.C. § 144. 
 71. See Virelli, supra note 64, at 1550, 1565–66. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)constitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. 
REV. 1181, 1189–90 (2011). 
 74. Frost, supra note 62, at 533. 
 75. Virelli, supra note 73, at 1202–05. The author could only find three such examples in American 
history: one by Justice Rehnquist, one by Justice Scalia (both discussed later in the chapter) , and one by 
Justice Jackson criticizing a decision by Justice Black not to recuse himself in a particular case. Id. 
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recuse herself in the initial litigation over President Obama’s 
Affordable Care Act (ACA).76 
A.   Justice Kagan and the ACA 
During her first term on the Supreme Court, Justice Elena Kagan 
recused herself from almost one-third of the cases on the Court’s 
docket,77 and she eventually recused herself from nationally 
important and controversial immigration78 and affirmative action 
cases.79 Although she never explained why (and, under the rules, she 
did not have to explain—a transparency issue in and of itself), 
presumably Justice Kagan recused herself from these cases because 
federal law requires a Justice to recuse if she had been a lawyer on 
the case before she sat on the Court.80 Justice Kagan had likely 
worked on these cases while heading the United States Solicitor 
General’s Office.81 
On March 21, 2010, the United States House of Representatives 
passed the ACA, otherwise known as “Obamacare.”82 The Senate 
passed the bill a few months earlier, making the final passage a major 
political victory for President Obama halfway through his first 
term.83 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 1183. 
 77. Lisa T. McElroy & Michael C. Dorf, Coming Off the Bench: Legal and Policy Implications of 
Proposals to Allow Retired Justices to Sit by Designation on the Supreme Court, 61 DUKE L.J. 81, 82 
(2011). 
 78. Stephen Dinan, High Court to Consider Ariz. Migrant Law, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/12/supreme-court-will-hear-arizona-immigration-law-
ca/?page=all. 
 79. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Agrees to Reconsider Use of Race in College Admission 
Decisions, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-
agrees-to-reconsider-use-of-race-in-college-admission-decisions/2012/02/21/gIQA2viJRR_story.html. 
 80. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1)–(4) (2012). 
 81. Susan Navarro Smelcer & Kenneth R. Thomas, From Solicitor General to Supreme Court 
Nominee: Responsibilities, History, and the Nomination of Elena Kagan, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 1, 15 
(June 23, 2010), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41299.pdf. 
 82. H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2010/h165# (last visited Jan. 27, 2016). 
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At the time, Elena Kagan was the Solicitor General of the United 
States responsible for representing the United States Government in 
the Supreme Court.84 Upon hearing the news that the ACA had 
passed, then-General Kagan wrote to Professor Laurence Tribe of 
Harvard Law School, at the time also a member of the Obama 
Administration, “I hear they have the votes, Larry!! Simply 
amazing.”85 The email’s subject line was “fingers and toes crossed 
today!”86 Her hope that the law would pass was obvious from these 
exchanges with one of the leading constitutional law scholars in the 
United States.87 
Then-General Kagan’s deputy, Neal Katyal, had previously asked 
her whether the Solicitor General’s Office should be involved in the 
litigation strategy in the lower courts should the law be passed and 
then challenged in court.88 General Kagan told her deputy that the 
Office should be involved from the very beginning, and later Katyal 
informed her of a meeting at the Department of Justice to discuss that 
strategy.89 There is no evidence that Kagan had any direct 
involvement in the case after that decision was made, but she clearly 
communicated to her deputy the importance of the case. Eventually, 
Katyal argued a few of the lower court cases challenging the ACA, 
and he has since said that he did so without input from Kagan 
(though he worked directly for her at the time).90 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.; Eric Segall, A Liberal’s Lament on Kagan and Health Care, SLATE (Dec. 8, 2011, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/12/obamacare_and_the_supreme_c
ourt_should_elena_kagan_recuse_herself_.html. 
 87. Jeffrey, supra note 83. Professor Laurence Tribe is considered the leading liberal constitutional 
law scholar of his time. Ben Jacobs, Harvard Scholar: Ted Cruz’s Citizenship, Eligibility for President 
‘Unsettled’, GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2016, 8:48 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/jan/11/laurence-tribe-ted-cruz-donald-trump-citizen-president. 
 88. See Josh Blackman, The Question No One Asked at Justice Kagan’s Confirmation Hearing: Why 
Did She Wall Herself Off from the Obamacare Litigation, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2013, 9:01 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2013/09/08/question-one-asked-justice-kagans-confirmation-hearing-wall-
obamacare-litigation. 
 89. Jonathan Turley, Should Kagan Recuse Herself from the Health Care Case?, JONATHAN TURLEY 
(Nov. 15 2011), http://jonathanturley.org/2011/11/15/should-kagan-recuse-herself-from-the-health-care-
case. 
 90. Terence P. Jeffrey, Kagan Assigned DOJ Lawyer Who Argued Obamacare Cases in Appeals 
Courts, CNS NEWS (June 3, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/kagan-assigned-
doj-lawyer-who-argued-obamacare-cases-appeals-courts. 
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On August 5, 2010, less than six months after the passage of the 
law, Elena Kagan was confirmed by the Senate as an associate justice 
of the United States Supreme Court.91 When the Court eventually 
decided to hear the legal challenges to Obamacare, there were 
numerous calls in the press—mostly by conservatives,92 but also by a 
few liberals,93 for Justice Kagan to recuse herself from the case 
because the Solicitor General’s office worked on the litigation in the 
lower courts. Conservative group Freedom Watch filed a formal 
motion for oral argument on the issue of whether Justice Kagan 
should participate in the case at the Supreme Court stage.94 
The argument for Justice Kagan’s recusal in the Obamacare case 
was based on numerous points.95 Although perhaps none of these 
aspects of her involvement with the ACA prior to the case alone 
required recusal, their cumulative effect demonstrated that Justice 
Kagan should have seriously considered recusing herself: 
1) Elena Kagan was the Solicitor General of the United States 
working for President Obama at the highest levels of the 
Administration at the time the ACA was furiously debated in 
Congress and town halls across the country;96 
2) The ACA was the most controversial and partisan piece of 
legislation that the Obama Administration put forward;97 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Paul Kane & Robert Barnes, Senate Confirms Elena Kagan’s Nomination to Supreme Court, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/05/ 
AR2010080505247.html. 
 92. Robert Barnes, Roberts Defends Supreme Court Colleagues on Recusal Issue, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 31, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/roberts-defends-supreme-court-colleagues-
on-recusal-issue/2011/12/29/gIQAp9fySP_story.html; Mark Maynes, Legislating a Supreme Court 
Recusal Process, WESTREFERENCEATTORNEYS.COM (Mar. 22, 2011), http://blog.legalsolutions. 
thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/legislating-a-supreme-court-recusal-process; Michael B. Mukasey, 
The ObamaCare Recusal Nonsense, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100 
01424052970204012004577070162911944188.html; Editorial, The Supreme Court’s Recusal Problem, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/01/opinion/the-supreme-courts-recusal-
problem.html?_r=0. 
 93. Segall, supra note 86. 
 94. Bill Mears, High Court Turns Aside Recusal Request on Health Care Challenge, CNN.COM (Jan. 
23, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/23/politics/scotus-health-care-recusal/. 
 95. See Eric J. Segall, Judicial Recusal at the Court, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 331, 338 
(2012) 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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3) President Obama nominated Elena Kagan to the Supreme Court 
shortly after Congress enacted the ACA;98 
4) The Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the ACA 
in the middle of President Obama’s reelection campaign;99 
5) The President’s reelection might well have been significantly 
affected by how the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of 
the ACA;100 
6) Elena Kagan celebrated the passage of the ACA over email with 
Professor Tribe and indicated that she was pleased that it passed and 
had been rooting for it to be passed;101 and 
7) Both Kagan’s Office and her top deputy, Neal Katyal, were 
directly involved in the Obama Administration’s litigation of the case 
in the lower federal courts urging that the ACA be upheld.102 
In light of these undisputed facts, Justice Kagan’s decision not to 
even address the recusal issue was inappropriate. The public had no 
way of knowing why Justice Kagan thought it was appropriate to 
hear the case because she offered no formal explanation and did not 
have to. Her recusal in many other cases (without comment) did not 
help the problem.103 Why did she pick one case, and to the best of our 
knowledge, only one case, to not work on while she was the Solicitor 
General? Was it so she could hear the challenge to the ACA as a 
Supreme Court Justice? If so, shouldn’t she then have recused 
herself? 
Given Justice Kagan’s silence, two substantial issues arose. First, 
many thought that Justice Kagan’s “impartiality” vis à vis the ACA 
could reasonably be questioned given the importance of the issue to 
the President and the fact that she was nominated during the 
controversy.104 Would President Obama have nominated someone to 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Segall, supra note 95. 
 102. Id. 
 103. The World’s 100 Most Powerful Women: Elena Kagan, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/ 
profile/elena-kagan (last visited Apr. 13, 2016). 
 104. Segall, supra note 95, at 338; James Sample, Supreme Court Recusal from Marbury to the 
Modern Day, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 145–46 (2013). 
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the Court unless he was reasonably sure she would vote to retain his 
most important legislative achievement during his campaign for 
reelection? The conversation—indeed, the skepticism—among legal 
pundits and talking heads was high.105 
Second, many believed that Justice Kagan was a “lawyer” on the 
ACA litigation in light of the fact that her office unquestionably 
worked on the case in the lower courts.106 Interested parties made 
both of these arguments in a formal motion presented to the Court 
during the ACA litigation.107 But, sadly, no hearing was held on the 
issue.108 
Even for those citizens who strongly supported the ACA, like this 
author, Justice Kagan’s possible impartiality posed a difficult and 
important question.109 For example, if as many predicted the law was 
to be upheld five to four, was there any reasonable scenario in which 
Justice Kagan could have written the majority opinion? After all, her 
office and the lawyers who worked directly for her had litigated the 
case in the lower courts.110 Even non-lawyers understood and 
pondered the conflict.111 The fact that such a result was hard to 
imagine should have demonstrated that Justice Kagan’s 
                                                                                                                 
 105. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Calls for Recusal Intensify in Health Care Case, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 
2011, 8:56 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-11-20/supreme-court-
obamacare-health/51324806/1; Stephen Dinan, Health Case Raises Recusal Questions for Kagan, 
Thomas, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/14/court-
announcement-raises-recusal-questions-kagan-/?page=all; Ronald Rotunda, Evidence Mounts against 
Justice Kagan for Recusal in ObamaCare Suit, FOX NEWS (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
opinion/2012/01/26/evidence-mounts-against-justice-kagan-for-recusal-in-obamacare-suit. 
 106. See Segall, supra note 95. 
 107. Brief of Amicus Curiae Freedom Watch in Support of Neither Party and on Issue of Recusal or 
Disqualification of Justice Elena Kagan, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (U.S. 
2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398 and 11-400). 
 108. See Mears, supra note 94. 
 109. See Editorial, Health Care and the Court, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/health-care-and-the-court/2011/12/02/gIQA1FbjTO_story. 
html. 
 110. See Mears, supra note 94. 
 111. See generally Ben Johnson, Kagan’s Participation in ObamaCare Decision may have Violated 
Judicial Ethics and Federal Statute, LIFE SITE NEWS (June 29, 2012), http://www.lifesitenews.com/ 
news/kagans-participation-in-obamacare-taints-the-decision; Tom Thurlow, Elena Kagan: The 
ObamaCare Recusal that Wasn’t, AMERICAN THINKER (June 21, 2012), http://www.american 
thinker.com/2012/06/elena_kagan_the_obamacare_recusal_that_wasnt.html. But see Jess Bravin, 
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“impartiality” was at a minimum in doubt. Moreover, because it is 
indisputable that her chief deputy Katyal would have had to recuse 
himself from the case had he been the newly minted Justice on the 
Court (because he was the lawyer of record on the case below), it 
makes little sense that his boss—to whom he answered—was 
impartial enough to sit on the case. 
Finally, it appears that the only litigation Justice Kagan 
deliberately refrained from working on during her term as the 
Solicitor General of the United States was the ACA case.112 Why that 
case and not the important affirmative action case or the controversial 
immigration law case or the other hundreds of cases from which she 
recused herself? This disturbing question (never answered by Justice 
Kagan) raised substantial issues about her decision to hear the ACA 
case and her impartiality with respect to it. 
The point is not that Elena Kagan should have recused herself 
from the ACA case. Rather, the lesson is that she should have 
handled her decision not to recuse differently. In fact, she did nothing 
and said nothing. When a non-party moved for oral argument on the 
recusal question, the motion became an official part of the record in 
the case.113 Still, the Court denied the motion 8-0 with no explanation 
(although at least Justice Kagan did not participate in that 
decision).114 
The issues surrounding Justice Kagan and Obamacare vividly 
demonstrate the transparency problems with the Court’s recusal 
procedures. Professor Amanda Frost detailed these problems in an 
article in which she pointed out the many ways recusal procedures 
differ from the normal methods of adjudication: 
Unlike almost any other area of the law, the process by 
which judges decide whether to recuse themselves ignores 
the systems usually employed to resolve disputes in a fair 
and impartial manner. As a general matter, the recusal 
                                                                                                                 
 112. See Editorial, supra note 109. 
 113. Orders in Pending Cases (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/012 
312zor.pdf. 
 114. Id. 
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process is usually not adversarial, does not provide for a 
full airing of the relevant facts, is not bounded by a 
developed body of law, and often is not concluded by the 
issuance of a reasoned explanation for the judge’s decision. 
Most importantly, the decision itself is almost always made 
in the first instance by the very judge being asked to 
disqualify himself, even though that judge has an obvious 
personal stake in the matter. [T]his very ad hoc and 
informal process, rather than any problem with the 
substantive standards for recusal . . . has led to the recurring 
dissatisfaction with the law.115 
All of these problems arose with Justice Kagan’s refusal to even 
address the recusal issues in the Obamacare case. There was never an 
adversarial hearing on the appropriateness of her failure to recuse, the 
public never learned the truth or falsity of many of the relevant facts, 
the law as to the meaning of the word “lawyer” in the recusal statute 
remained undefined for further purposes, and we never heard from 
Justice Kagan on the topic (other than a few general remarks at her 
confirmation hearing before the controversy arose). Although the 
motion to recuse in this case came from a non-party, there are no 
requirements that the Justices act differently when such a motion 
comes through a party to the case. This lack of transparency is a 
serious flaw in the process that Professor Frost, among others, argues 
needs to be remedied with federal legislation.116 
The Obamacare case was one of the most important Supreme 
Court decisions of this century, keeping the public’s attention for 
years. It could have (or maybe did play) a major role in a national 
election. The issue of whether Justice Kagan should participate in the 
case was discussed in major newspapers, online journals, and was the 
subject of a formal motion—likely a meritorious one—before the 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Frost, supra note 62, at 536 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. at 552, 558; Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Courts, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 1213, 1251 (2002); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 
643 (1987); Virelli, supra note 73, at 1190–91. 
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Court.117 If Justice Kagan had been a lower court judge, at least other 
judges would have reviewed her decision not to recuse as a matter of 
appeal. Yet, Justice Kagan was silent, her decision was unreviewable, 
and once again the Supreme Court of the United States acted in 
almost total secrecy. 
B.   Justice Rehnquist and the Failure to Recuse 
The troubling case of Elena Kagan and the ACA is not an isolated 
instance of a Supreme Court Justice facing a difficult recusal issue. 
Another disturbing example is Laird v. Tatum,118 and Justice William 
Rehnquist’s failure to recuse.119 
Prior to becoming a Supreme Court Justice, Rehnquist was the 
head of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) inside the Department of 
Justice.120 This Office provides legal advice to the president on 
difficult legal questions.121 
While Justice Rehnquist was the head of the OLC, there arose a 
dispute over the legality of a widespread domestic surveillance 
program implemented by the military.122 The Army allegedly spied 
on American citizens critical of the Vietnam War.123 As part of the 
Nixon Administration, Rehnquist spoke out publicly (and in front of 
Congress) on the constitutional validity of the program and even 
testified that the lawsuit challenging the program should be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction.124 
By the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court, and 
after the court of appeals had found that it had jurisdiction over the 
case, Rehnquist was an associate justice.125 He not only had a 
“personal and professional stake in the legality and continued 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Lyle Denniston, A Note on Kagan and Health Care, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 23, 2012, 10:40 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/a-note-on-kagan-and-health-care/; Mears, supra note 94. 
 118. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972). 
 119. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Chief William’s Ghost: The Problematic Persistence of the Duty to Sit, 
57 BUFF. L. REV. 813, 851–63 (2009). 
 120. Id. at 852. 
 121. Id. at 852–53 n.113. 
 122. Id. at 852. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 852–53. 
 125. Stempel, supra note 119, at 854. 
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operation of the program, [and had] formed views on this particular 
program’s constitutionality prior to ascending to the bench,” but he 
also “appeared to have partiality toward the government’s view of 
both the procedural and substantive merits of any challenge to the 
surveillance program.”126 Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist decided to 
sit on the case. The plaintiffs’ claims were eventually dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction by a 5–4 vote.127 Had Justice Rehnquist recused 
himself, the case would have gone forward because a tie vote in the 
Supreme Court would have affirmed the lower court decision finding 
jurisdiction proper. 
In a rare public statement by a Supreme Court Justice, Rehnquist 
tried to justify his decision to review the case despite his obvious 
prejudgment of its merits.128 As he explained (in a concept that would 
later be adopted by Justices Roberts and Scalia), Supreme Court 
Justices have a “duty to sit” unless the case for recusal is crystal 
clear.129 Here, Justice Rehnquist said, it was not: 
Those federal courts of appeals which have considered the 
matter have unanimously concluded that a federal judge has 
a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as 
strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified. These cases 
dealt with disqualification on the part of judges of the 
district courts and of the courts of appeals. I think that the 
policy in favor of the ‘equal duty’ concept is even stronger 
in the case of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States. There is no way of substituting Justices on this 
Court as one judge may be substituted for another in the 
district courts. There is no higher court of appeal which 
may review an equally divided decision of this Court and 
thereby establish the law for our jurisdiction. While it can 
seldom be predicted with confidence at the time that a 
Justice addresses himself to the issue of disqualification 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Id. at 853. 
 127. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3 (1972). 
 128. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837–38 (1972). 
 129. Id. 
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whether or not the Court in a particular case will be closely 
divided, the disqualification of one Justice of this Court 
raises the possibility of an affirmance of the judgment 
below by an equally divided Court. The consequence 
attending such a result is, of course, that the principle of 
law presented by the case is left unsettled. The 
undesirability of such a disposition is obviously not a 
reason for refusing to disqualify oneself where in fact one 
deems himself disqualified, but I believe it is a reason for 
not ‘bending over backwards’ in order to deem one’s self 
disqualified.130 
History has not been kind to Justice Rehnquist’s decision to sit on 
Laird v. Tatum.131 When he was nominated to be Chief Justice in 
1986, the issue of his failure to recuse in Laird arose again, with 
national experts on judicial ethics testifying in Congress that Justice 
Rehnquist acted as “a ‘judge in his own case,’” and arguing that there 
was at least “a reasonable question as to his impartiality.”132 
If Rehnquist is correct that Supreme Court Justices have a higher 
obligation to sit on cases than lower court judges, then perhaps he (as 
well as Justice Kagan in the ACA case) acted reasonably. If, 
however, doubts should be resolved in favor of recusal, perhaps to 
maintain the public’s faith in the justice system or to insure fair and 
impartial justice, then it is hard to imagine that Rehnquist should 
have resolved a case involving a spying program he publicly 
defended while a member of the Administration that created the 
program after he publicly said the case should be dismissed for lack 
of jurisdiction (a result he voted for when he became a Justice). 
C.   Recusal and the Constitution 
The issue of judicial recusal can in some cases be so important that 
it even rises to the constitutional level. The Fifth Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
 130. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 131. Stempel, supra note 119, at 861. 
 132. Id. at 862. 
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guarantees every litigant in state and federal court the “due process of 
law.”133 If a judge or justice sitting on a case is actually biased, or 
even if there is a probability of actual bias, this constitutional 
protection may be triggered.134 
The Supreme Court identified this aspect of recusal in an important 
and interesting case involving the West Virginia Supreme Court.135 
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,136 Caperton and his coal 
companies (Caperton) alleged that the defendant, A.T. Massey Coal 
Co. (Massey), fraudulently canceled a contract “after conducting 
cost-benefit analyses,” concluding that “it was in [Massey’s] 
financial interest to” completely destroy Caperton’s business.137 In 
2002, a West Virginia jury returned a verdict for Caperton for fifty 
million dollars, finding that Massey intentionally tried to destroy 
Caperton’s business in “utter disregard” of Caperton’s rights.138 
Aware that the West Virginia Supreme Court would consider the 
appeal and knowing that judicial elections were coming in 2004, Don 
Blankenship—Massey’s chairman, chief executive officer, and 
president—decided to strongly support attorney Brent Benjamin in 
his campaign to defeat incumbent Justice Warren McGraw, who was 
up for reelection to the West Virginia Supreme Court.139 
After the fifty million dollar jury verdict, but before Massey 
appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court, Blankenship spent 
enormous sums of money and devoted great energy trying to ensure 
that Benjamin would defeat the incumbent McGraw.140 In addition to 
directly contributing the $1,000 maximum to Benjamin’s campaign 
committee, Blankenship gave almost $2.5 million to “And for the 
Sake of the Kids,” a political organization supporting Benjamin.141 
Blankenship also spent over $500,000 on direct mailings, letters, and 
                                                                                                                 
 133. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 134. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009). 
 135. Id. at 872–73. 
 136. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008). 
 137. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 872. 
 138. Id. at 872. 
 139. Id. at 873. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
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television and print advertisements, to support Benjamin in his quest 
to become a justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court.142 
Blankenship’s three million dollars in contributions exceeded the 
total amount spent by the rest of Benjamin’s supporters and three 
times the total spent by Benjamin’s own campaign committee.143 
With this massive financial help from Massey, Benjamin defeated 
McGraw and won the seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court.144 In 
October 2005, Caperton filed a motion to disqualify the newly 
elected Justice Benjamin from the case under both the due process 
clause of the United States Constitution and the West Virginia Code 
of Judicial Conduct because of the conflict of interest caused by 
Blankenship’s substantial campaign support of Justice Benjamin.145 
Benjamin denied the recusal motion in April 2006, on the basis that 
he found “no objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a 
bias for or against any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the 
matters which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be 
anything but fair and impartial.”146 
Eventually, the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the fifty 
million dollar jury verdict Caperton won against Blankenship and his 
company by a vote of 3–2, with Justice Benjamin (not surprisingly) 
joining the majority opinion.147 Caperton sought a rehearing and 
again moved for disqualification of Benjamin, as well as another 
Justice, Elliot “Spike” Maynard.148 Photos were discovered of Justice 
Maynard “vacationing with Blankenship in the French Riviera while 
the case was pending.”149 
                                                                                                                 
 142. Id. 
 143. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 873 (“Caperton contends that Blankenship spent $1 million more than the 
total amount spent by the campaign committees of both candidates combined.”). 
 144. Id. (“[Benjamin] received 382,036 votes (53.3%), and McGraw received 334,301 votes 
(46.7%).”). 
 145. Id. at 873–74. 
 146. Id. at 874. 
 147. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W. Va. 2008). 
 148. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 874–75; see Keith R. Fisher, Selva Oscura: Judicial Campaign 
Contributions, Disqualification, and Due Process, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 767, 788 (2010). 
 149. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 874. 
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Justice Maynard granted Caperton’s recusal motion.150 Meanwhile, 
another Justice, Larry Starcher, also recused himself from any further 
involvement in the case based on his public criticism of 
Blankenship’s direct and substantial role in the 2004 judicial 
elections.151 In his memorandum on recusal, Starcher urged Justice 
Benjamin to recuse himself because “Blankenship’s bestowal of his 
personal wealth, political tactics, and ‘friendship’ created a cancer in 
the affairs of this Court.”152 Justice Benjamin, however, declined that 
suggestion from his colleague and again denied Caperton’s motion 
that Benjamin recuse himself from the motion to rehear the case.153 
Benjamin did not explain himself.154 
The West Virginia Supreme Court then granted a rehearing on 
some of the legal issues decided in prior proceedings, with Justice 
Benjamin now acting as the Chief Justice.155 He personally selected 
two other judges to replace the recused Justices, and Caperton moved 
to disqualify Justice Benjamin for the third time. Benjamin again 
refused, despite the fact that polls showed that over 67% of West 
Virginians doubted that Benjamin would be either fair or impartial.156 
A divided court (one might say a circus) again reversed the jury 
verdict by another 3–2 vote with Benjamin again in the majority. The 
dissenting Justices said that “the majority opinion” was “unsupported 
by the facts and existing case law,” and was “fundamentally 
unfair.”157 The dissent also noted that there were serious “due process 
implications” due to Benjamin’s failure to disqualify himself from 
the case.158 
Four months later, Justice Benjamin filed yet another opinion, 
again defending the merits of the reversal of the jury verdict and his 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 874–75. 
 152. Id. at 875. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Fisher, supra note 148, at 788. 
 155. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 875. 
 156. Id. Benjamin countered that a “‘push poll’ was ‘neither credible nor sufficiently reliable to serve 
as the basis for an elected judge’s disqualification.’” Id. (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 
679 S.E.2d 223, 292 n.11 (W. Va. 2008)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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own decision not to recuse. He said again that he had no “direct, 
personal, substantial, pecuniary interest”159 in the matter and 
concluded that the motion to recuse “seems little more than an 
invitation to subject West Virginia’s justice system to the vagaries of 
the day—a framework in which predictability and stability yield to 
supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan manipulations.”160 He 
did not acknowledge that these very types of suppositions and 
innuendo were behind the recusal rules in the first place—rules put in 
place to ensure that judges were fair and that the public perceived 
them to be so. 
Finally, the Supreme Court of the United States decided to hear the 
case.161 The same Court that has Justices who virtually never explain 
their own decisions to recuse or not to recuse overturned both 
Benjamin’s decision not to recuse himself and the reversal of the jury 
verdict. In its opinion, the Court said that although most recusal 
issues do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation and are 
controlled by state law and local judicial codes, when there is “the 
probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision-maker” 
the due process clause does come into play.162 The Court held that, as 
a matter of constitutional law, Justice Benjamin should have recused 
himself from the case. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, said 
the following: 
We conclude that there is a serious risk of actual bias—
based on objective and reasonable perceptions—when a 
person with a personal stake in a particular case had a 
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the 
judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s 
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. 
The inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in 
comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the 
campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. at 876 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822 (1986)). 
 160. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 877 (citing Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
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apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the 
election.163 
Although the Caperton case raises unusual issues of campaign 
support for state supreme court judges, the majority’s holding that, at 
a certain level, the probability of actual bias rises to a constitutional 
violation shows why recusal motions against the Justices of the 
United States Supreme Court raise such important concerns. Litigants 
with strong recusal motions (such as the plaintiffs in the Laird case) 
may bring with them the constitutional concern for fair hearings 
consistent with due process. Those motions should be addressed the 
same way the Supreme Court treated the motion in Caperton, with a 
full adversarial process and a publicly available written explanation. 
Yet, when a recusal motion is directed to a Supreme Court Justice, 
there is virtually never a public hearing or written opinion. Perhaps 
one of the reasons for this lack of process is the controversial “duty 
to sit” relied upon by Justice Rehnquist in the Laird case (though at 
least in that instance he wrote a public explanation). 
D.   The “Duty to Sit” 
Every year the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
issues a year-end report summarizing the state of the federal 
judiciary.164 In December 2011, amidst a media frenzy discussing 
whether Justices Kagan and Thomas should both recuse themselves 
from the ACA litigation,165 Justice Roberts used the report to address 
these concerns (among other ethical issues discussed in the next 
section), though he did not mention either Justice by name.166 
                                                                                                                 
 163. Id. at 884. 
 164. Chief Justice’s Year-End Reports on the Federal Judiciary, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., 
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/year-endreports.aspx (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
 165. Justice Thomas’s wife had formed a lobbying group to fight the President’s health care law. 
Mike Sacks, Justice Elena Kagan in Health Care Case?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 18, 2011, 7:45 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/18/supreme-court-health-care-justice-elena-kagan-
recusal_n_1102337.html. 




Published by Reading Room, 2016
816 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
The Chief Justice began by stating that the “Justices follow the 
same general principles respecting recusal as other federal judges, but 
the application of those principles can differ due to the unique 
circumstances of the Supreme Court.”167 He then summarized many 
of the principles of recusal set forth in the applicable laws and 
intimated that the Justices take these rules seriously. Chief Justice 
Roberts then distinguished the Supreme Court Justices from lower 
court judges: 
Although a Justice’s process for considering recusal is 
similar to that of the lower court judges, the Justice must 
consider an important factor that is not present in the lower 
courts. Lower court judges can freely substitute for one 
another. If an appeals court or district court judge 
withdraws from a case, there is another federal judge who 
can serve in that recused judge’s place. But the Supreme 
Court consists of nine Members who always sit together, 
and if a Justice withdraws from a case, the Court must sit 
without its full membership. A Justice accordingly cannot 
withdraw from a case as a matter of convenience or simply 
to avoid controversy. Rather, each Justice has an obligation 
to the Court to be sure of the need to recuse before deciding 
to withdraw from a case.168 
Justice Roberts is correct that a Justice should not recuse herself 
from a case simply “as a matter of convenience or simply to avoid a 
controversy.”169 But his statement that “the Supreme Court consists 
of nine Members who always sit together, and if a Justice withdraws 
from a case, the Court must sit without its full membership,” does not 
necessarily justify a different and more lax recusal requirement for 
Supreme Court Justices.170 The requirements of judicial fairness and 
impartiality are central to the rule of law and a fair justice system. 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Yet, the “duty to sit” has also been expressed by other Justices. For 
example, in a rare opinion issued by a justice in a recusal matter, 
Justice Scalia justified his decision to stay on a case involving then-
Vice President Dick Cheney partly on the grounds that, although 
lower court judges should possibly “resolve any doubts in favor of 
recusal,” because if they so recuse, their places would be “taken by 
another judge,” on “the Supreme Court . . . the consequence is 
different: The Court proceeds with eight Justices, raising the 
possibility that, by reason of a tie vote, it will find itself unable to 
resolve the significant legal issue presented by the case.”171 Justice 
Scalia also argued that Supreme Court Justices should have different 
recusal standards than other judges because, when a Justice recuses 
herself, that is the equivalent of a vote against the party who lost the 
case who needs five votes out of nine to reverse the decision because 
after the recusal of a Justice, the moving party only has an eight-
Justice Court.172 
The problems with the notion that Supreme Court Justices should 
have different recusal standards than lower court judges because they 
cannot be replaced are two-fold. First, there is no basis in 
constitutional text, history, or case law to assume that it is inevitable 
that a Supreme Court Justice could not be replaced by either another 
living justice or possibly a random alternating panel of lower court 
judges. That Article III of our Constitution provides there “shall” be 
“one Supreme Court,” does not mean that the Court has to be made 
up of the same nine identical judges for every case that is heard. 
Professors Michael Dorf and Lisa McElroy have argued that reading 
the Constitution to require that the same nine Justices must hear 
every case would be an overly formalistic reading of Article III and 
inconsistent with the best reading of text and history.173 Second, if 
the phrase “one Supreme Court,” means the same Justices have to 
hear every case, then every recusal would be unconstitutional.174 The 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913, 915 (2004). 
 172. Id. at 915–16. 
 173. McElroy & Dorf, supra note 77, at 107–12; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 174. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial [p]ower of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court . . . .”); McElroy & Dorf, supra note 77, at 110–11. 
31
Segall: Invisible Justices
Published by Reading Room, 2016
818 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
Constitution simply should not be interpreted to reach such a bizarre 
interpretation. 
In sum, there are numerous problems with how the Supreme Court 
currently handles recusal issues. The current recusal process (1) does 
not provide for a full adversarial hearing, (2) does not implicate a 
known body of written case law, (3) usually does not result in a 
written decision by the judge sought to be recused, and (4) there is no 
formal appeal of the decision to other judges. All of the important 
protections and safeguards built into the normal litigation process are 
missing from the Justices’ recusal disputes. 
To those who care about transparency, the Supreme Court recusal 
process is fundamentally flawed. In her excellent article, Professor 
Frost offered solutions to improve the process.175 First, the law 
should be amended to give parties an official time period within 
which to file recusal motions after first receiving information that the 
judge hearing their case may be biased or suffer from a conflict of 
interest.176 Second, judges should be required to disclose information 
to the parties that may lead to the appearance of impropriety. Third, 
the law should require that no judge be the judge of his own 
recusal.177 At the Supreme Court level, this would mean that recusal 
motions should be resolved by the eight other Justices (or possibly a 
changing subcommittee of the Court). Fourth and finally, but perhaps 
most importantly, judges should be required to give written reasons 
for the grant or denial of a motion to recuse.178 This statement of 
reasons can be short in easy cases, but the public’s faith in the 
judicial process would be greatly increased by judges being 
transparent about the reasons they recuse or not in hard cases.179 This 
requirement is especially important in the case of Supreme Court 
Justices, given that there is no appellate review of a Justice’s decision 
to participate in a case. 
                                                                                                                 
 175. See Frost, supra note 62, at 581–90. 
 176. Id. at 582. 
 177. Id. at 583–84 
 178. Id. at 589–90. 
 179. Id. 
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III.   ETHICAL RULES 
Congress has passed a comprehensive set of ethical rules 
governing the off-the-bench activities of lower federal court judges. 
These rules prohibit federal judges from taking part in political 
activity,180 accepting certain gifts,181 and being the keynote speaker 
or guest of honor at dinners182 and receptions for political 
organizations.183 The overriding purpose of these detailed regulations 
is announced in the introduction of the ethical rules: 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to 
justice in our society. A judge should maintain and enforce 
high standards of conduct and should personally observe 
those standards, so that the integrity and independence of 
the judiciary may be preserved. The provisions of this Code 
should be construed and applied to further that objective.184 
Despite those noble objectives, the Supreme Court of the United 
States is not formally governed by these or any other rules governing 
their off-the-bench activities.185 In his 2011 year-end report, Chief 
                                                                                                                 
 180. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, Canon 5 (2011), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges. The code states: 
(A) General Prohibitions. A judge should not: 
 (1) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization; 
(2) make speeches for a political organization or candidate, or publicly 
endorse or oppose a candidate for public office; or 
(3) solicit funds for, pay an assessment to, or make a contribution to a 
political organization or candidate, or attend or purchase a ticket for a 
dinner or other event sponsored by a political organization or 
candidate. 
(B) Resignation upon Candidacy. A judge should resign the judicial office if the 
judge becomes a candidate in a primary or general election for any office. 
(C) Other Political Activity. A judge should not engage in any other political 
activity. This provision does not prevent a judge from engaging in activities 
described in Canon 4. 
Id. 
 181. Id. at Canon 4D(4). 
 182. Id. at Canon 4C. 
 183. Id. at Canon 5A. 
 184. Id. at Canon 1. 
 185. ROBERTS, supra note 166, at 3. 
33
Segall: Invisible Justices
Published by Reading Room, 2016
820 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
Justice Roberts argued that, because Article III of the Constitution 
requires that there “shall” be one Supreme Court, but that Congress 
may “from time to time” create lower federal courts, nobody other 
than the Court itself can make rules for the Justices.186 The Chief also 
said that the Justices, by internal memoranda, have voluntarily agreed 
to follow the financial disclosure and gift regulations in the rules, but 
that the rest of the Code, including the sections about public 
appearances, are not binding on the Justices albeit they are a “starting 
point and a key source of guidance for the Justices.”187 
Justice Roberts’s 2011 report on the ethical obligations (or lack 
thereof) of the Justices is troubling. Why would the Justices agree to 
be bound by some of those rules (binding on all other federal judges) 
but not others? Additionally, Justice Roberts’s conclusion that the 
Justices are completely free to adopt, or not, any ethical rules they 
see fit—no matter what Congress says—is highly questionable. 
Although the Constitution does require a Supreme Court,188 Congress 
is free within broad limits to shape the Court’s appellate jurisdiction 
(which is almost the Court’s entire jurisdiction) as Congress sees fit. 
Article III provides that the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction “with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the 
Congress shall make.”189 If Congress can shape, limit, or perhaps 
even remove the Court’s entire appellate jurisdiction, why can it not 
adopt reasonable “regulations” governing the Court’s ethical duties? 
There may be some limits to that power or Congress could 
potentially emasculate the Court through extreme regulation, but 
Justice Roberts never adequately explained why the quite rational 
ethical rules now in place that bind other federal judges are beyond 
Congress’s power. 
The Justices’ decision not to be bound by the same rules governing 
lower court judges has led to a number of controversies surrounding 
their off-the-bench activities. For example, Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito regularly participate in numerous events (and de facto fund 
                                                                                                                 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; ROBERTS, supra note 166, at 4. 
 187. ROBERTS, supra note 166, at 5. 
 188. U.S. CONST. art. III., § 1. 
 189. U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2. 
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raisers) for conservative organizations.190 In both January 2007 and 
January 2008, Justices Scalia and Thomas attended meetings 
sponsored by the politically-active Koch brothers at a posh resort in 
Southern California.191 Justice Alito has spoken at dinners held by 
the politically conservative magazine, the American Spectator.192 The 
Code of Ethics for lower courts prohibits judges from participating in 
fundraising activities, or using or permitting “the use of the prestige 
of judicial office for that purpose.”193 If the Court were bound by 
those rules, it is at best unclear whether these Justices could have 
engaged in those activities. 
For the last few years, the conservative Justices have also 
repeatedly been invited to be special guests of the annual conference 
of the Federalist Society, a prominent organization dedicated, in its 
own words, to 
[R]eordering priorities within the legal system to place a 
premium on individual liberty, traditional values, and the 
rule of law [and] restoring the recognition of the 
importance of these norms among lawyers, judges, law 
students and professors. In working to achieve these goals, 
the Society has created a conservative and libertarian 
intellectual network that extends to all levels of the legal 
community.194 
On the Federalist Society’s own website, Justice Roberts 
introduces a tribute video to the organization celebrating its twenty-
fifth anniversary.195 The video proclaims our Constitution’s 
                                                                                                                 
 190. R. Jeffrey Smith, Professors Ask Congress for an Ethics Code for Supreme Court, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 23, 2011, 10:40 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/23/AR201 
1022304975.html; Rmuse, Justices Thomas and Scalia Violate Judicial Ethics by Headlining Right 
Wing Fundraisers, POLITICUSUSA (Nov. 16, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://www.politicususa.com/2013/ 
11/16/justices-thomas-scalia-violate-judicial-ethics-headlining-wing-fundraisers.html. 
 191. Smith, supra note 190. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. ABOUT US: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016). 
 195. The Federalist Society, 25th Anniversary Tribute Video, YOUTUBE (Nov. 15 2007), 
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“preference for free markets rather than centralized government 
control,” and discusses the “wrong turn” taken by many “liberal 
professors” who discuss issues in “only one way.”196 
The Federalist Society is home to many nationally famous 
conservative members, including Randy Barnett, the Georgetown law 
professor who devised much of the litigation strategy in the first 
Obamacare case, and numerous other law professors who 
consistently file amicus briefs in the Supreme Court on hotly debated 
constitutional issues such as abortion, affirmative action, and 
campaign finance reform.197 
In addition to attending the national convention of this 
organization on numerous occasions, Justice Thomas was the 2013 
keynote speaker featured at the main dinner with an audience 
exceeding 1,000 people, including Justices Scalia and Alito.198 A 
lower court judge probably could not have played that role given the 
federal prohibition on such judges being the keynote speaker or guest 
of honor at dinners and receptions for political organizations.199 It is 
one thing for the Justices to give talks to diverse academic and civic 
organizations, but quite another for them to lend their public persona 
on numerous occasions to an organization whose very mission is to 
further a conservative and libertarian constitutional agenda. 
Of course, not only conservative Justices frequently visit academic 
and civic organizations with a decided political tilt. Justices Breyer, 
Sotomayor, Stevens, and Ginsburg have all been featured speakers at 
the liberal American Constitutional Society obviously helping that 
organization raise funds for its many causes.200 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PEsxcuP-Sv4. 
 196. Id. 
 197. EXPERTS: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, http://www.fed-soc.org/experts/ (last visited Apr. 14, 
2016). 
 198. See 2013 NATIONAL LAWYERS CONVENTION: EVENTS: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, 
http://www.fed-soc.org/events/detail/2013-national-lawyers-convention (last visited Apr. 14, 2016); 
David Lat, Justice Clarence Thomas Speaks!, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 15, 2013, 1:34 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2013/11/justice-clarence-thomas-speaks-and-oh-what-a-speech/. 
 199. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES, supra note 180. 
 200. Michael McGough, Opinion, Are Supreme Court Justices Becoming “Party Judges?”, L.A. 
TIMES (May 14, 2014, 3:16 PM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-supreme-court-
bishops-partisanship-20140514-story.html. 
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Regardless of whether these Justices have actually violated the 
ethical obligations applicable to lower federal judges, the Court’s 
dismissive attitude towards those rules is highly disturbing, 
especially when it comes to the public’s perception of the Court’s 
commitment to the rule of law. Over the last few years, over one-
hundred public interest organizations,201 and a group of over one-
hundred law professors, have formally asked that the Court fully 
embrace all of the ethical rules binding on lower court judges.202 The 
executive vice-president of one of those public interest organizations 
stated that “[t]he nation’s highest court shouldn’t have the lowest 
ethical standards.”203 Additionally, [a]pplying the Code of Conduct to 
the Supreme Court is a common sense move that will help ensure that 
Americans can count on basic fairness throughout our judicial 
system.”204 
Congresswomen Louise Slaughter, who has sponsored legislation 
attempting to place the Court under the same rules as other courts, 
has put it this way: “[U]nlike all other federal judges, the justices of 
the U.S. Supreme Court are not bound by a code of ethics.”205 In light 
of this long-term public outcry over the ethical practices of the 
Supreme Court, Justice Roberts’s 2011 year-end report was even 
more disheartening.206 His “trust us because we are good people 
approach” to this problem is unsatisfactory, especially because the 
public comes to trust the Justices through the Court’s actions, not 
merely its words. After all, the hundreds of lower court judges 
actually bound by the ethics rules were also nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate and are supposed to be men 
and women of good character and strong ethics. Yet, they must 
follow sensible guidelines governing their off-the-court activities. 
Supreme Court Justices should not be treated differently. 
                                                                                                                 
 201. Lisa Graves, Supremely Unseemly Conduct by Supreme Court Justices Spurs Call for Mandatory 
Ethics Rules, PR WATCH (Jan. 9 2012, 1:10 PM), http://www.prwatch.org/NODE/11226. 
 202. Smith, supra note 190. 
 203. Graves, supra note 201. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Ethics and Accountability, CONGRESSWOMAN LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, http://www.louise. 
house.gov/issues/ethics (last visited Apr. 14, 2016). 
 206. Roberts, supra note 166. 
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The public needs to have faith in its judicial system—especially 
the highest Court in the land. If anything, the nine Justices of that 
Court should be bound by more detailed and tougher ethical 
guidelines than lower court judges who number in the hundreds. 
Indispensable elements of a just and transparent Court are that the 
Justices engage in ethical off-the-Court activities, and that they 
explain difficult recusal questions transparently and openly. Congress 
should add the Justices to the ethical statutes covering lower federal 
court judges. As I said in the Los Angeles Times shortly after Justice 
Roberts issued his 2011 report, “this request for blind allegiance and 
judicial silence smacks of hubris.”207 The American people deserve 
better. 
IV.   THE MYSTERIOUS WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
[T]he screening function is inextricably linked to the 
fulfillment of the Court’s essential duties and is vital to the 
effective performance of the Court’s unique mission “to 
define the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to assure 
the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the 
constitutional distribution of powers in our federal system.” 
    Justice William Brennan208 
Every year the Supreme Court of the United States receives over 
7,500 requests from litigants who have lost their lawsuits in the lower 
courts and seek reversal of those decisions.209 Lawyers spend 
thousands of hours working on briefs supporting those requests, and 
the parties pay those lawyers significant amounts of money. In recent 
years, the Court has granted approximately seventy-five to eighty of 
those requests per year.210 
                                                                                                                 
 207. Eric J. Segall, Op-Ed, An Ominous Silence on the Supreme Court, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/12/opinion/la-oe-segall-kagan-recusal-20120212. 
 208. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential 
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 394 (2004). 
 209. The Judicial Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/1600/judicial-branch 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
 210. Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREME CT. OF THE U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
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Our country has a strong, vested interest in which cases the Court 
deems worthy of its attention because those cases may well dictate 
national policy across the spectrum of important social, legal, 
educational, political, and economic issues. Yet, despite the public 
significance of the certiorari process, the Justices decide which cases 
to hear “according to vague guidelines that afford them maximum 
discretion, based on very little collegial deliberation, with virtually 
no public disclosure or explanation of their actions and subject to no 
precedential constraints.”211 
Although there are instructions concerning the timing and structure 
of the briefs that need to be submitted,212 and some vague 
considerations the Court may take into account in the process of 
deciding whether a case is worthy of its attention,213 there are no 
rules or statutes governing exactly how many Justices it takes to hear 
a case or any other important issues surrounding the writ of 
certiorari.214 The present informal practice is that it takes four 
Justices to agree to grant certiorari for a case to be heard.215 The 
Justices keep secret who votes to grant the petitions and never 
provide reasons for denying a petition to hear a case, though 
dissenting Justices will occasionally write separately to argue that a 
petition that did not get four votes should have been granted.216 No 
formal record of the votes to grant or deny certiorari is ever 
published.217 
There are many important things we do not know about the 
mysterious writ of certiorari, but one thing is certain: how the 
                                                                                                                 
faq.aspx#faqgi9 (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
 211. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 208, at 390. 
 212. See SUP. CT. R. 15 & 29, http://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2013RulesoftheCourt.pdf 
(providing wide-ranging rules from detailed formatting requirements to content restrictions). 
 213. Id. at 10. Rule 10 sets forth a number of considerations including whether there has been a circuit 
split on the issue, whether the decision decided an important issue of federal law, or whether the 
decision is inconsistent with other decisions of the Court. In the rule, the Court makes clear that these 
criteria are “neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court’s discretion . . . .” Id. 
 214. See id. at 10−16. 
 215. See Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last visited Feb. 
Apr. 20, 2016). 
 216. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 208, at 402. 
 217. Id. 
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Justices decide which of the very few cases, out of the thousands 
coming from the lower courts, they select to hear is more akin to the 
“Star Chamber” model of judging than an open and transparent 
process befitting a representative democracy.218 
A.   What Cases do the Justices Have to Hear? 
Article III of the Constitution divides the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction into original and appellate jurisdiction.219 In the landmark 
case of Marbury v. Madison,220 the Court held that it could not 
exercise original jurisdiction (even if Congress wanted it to) except in 
the three narrow categories expressly set forth in Article III: cases 
involving ambassadors, other “public [m]inisters and [c]onsuls,” and 
where a state is a party.221 In all other cases, most of which arise 
under federal law or the Constitution, the Court has appellate 
jurisdiction.222 Although Congress cannot add to the Court’s original 
jurisdiction, the Justices can (and do) send cases within their original 
jurisdiction to the lower courts for review first if they so desire.223 
Virtually all of the cases the Court hears are pursuant to its appellate 
jurisdiction.224 
From the time the Constitution was ratified until 1925, the 
Supreme Court had to hear most cases within the jurisdiction that 
Congress granted.225 This was not a huge problem until the late 
nineteenth century when the country began industrializing and 
Congress enacted many new laws leading to increased federal 
                                                                                                                 
 218. The Star Chamber was a court of law that sat at the Palace of Westminster that held trials in 
secret. Daniel L. Vande Zande, Coercive Power and the Demise of the Star Chamber, 50 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 326, 326 (2010) (stating that “[t]he English Court of the Star Chamber is subject to an enduring 
legacy, having become a synonym for secrecy, severity and extreme injustice”). It has been described as 
having “stripped the delinquent of his constitutional defence . . . and left him open to the capricious and 
tyrannical will and humour of arbitrary judges . . . .” THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER, OR SEAT OF 
OPPRESSION 9 (1768). 
 219. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 220. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 221. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 215. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 208, at 392. 
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litigation.226 The Justices at that time lobbied to have more discretion 
in their caseload, leading to the Judiciary Act of 1925,227 which was 
also called “The Judges’ Bill” because of who worked hard to get it 
passed.228 This law gave the Justices more control over their docket 
selection, but still required them to resolve all cases on appeal where 
a federal court struck down a state law or a state court rejected a 
federal claim asserted by the plaintiff.229 The Justices eventually 
found a way to evade this mandatory appellate jurisdiction by 
frequently deciding cases with summary affirmances, meaning on the 
basis of the opinion by the lower court.230 Eventually, in 1988, the 
Justices achieved what they had long wanted—the almost complete 
abolition of its mandatory jurisdiction.231 
Today, the Supreme Court has almost 100% control over its own 
docket, a power wielded by only a few other courts.232 For example, 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 230. Cordray & Cordray, supra note 208, 393–94. 
 231. The Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 232. The spectrum of discretion regarding certiorari is evidenced by courts throughout the globe. The 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has little discretion in denying cases, but is able to alleviate its 
docket by a rigorous screening process: 
[T]he Court’s procedure still reflects the strongly held and perhaps quixotic 
view—dating back to the era of the Court’s origins—that every person filing a 
Constitutional Complaint is, in principle, entitled to a decision on the merits. 
 As a result, the overwhelming majority of decisions of the 
Constitutional Court are not rendered by a full Senate, but rather by three-judge 
committees (Kammern) whose task is to screen and decide most of these 
Constitutional Complaints. These screening committees function in the following 
manner: if a committee finds that a Constitutional Complaint is clearly without 
merit—or if it is otherwise unacceptable on certain other grounds—the committee 
dismisses the Complaint. If, in contrast, the committee finds that the Complaint is 
clearly meritorious, it may issue a decision in favor of the complainant. In both 
kinds of cases, the committee’s decision must be unanimous, and it is 
unreviewable. 
Peter E. Quint, Leading a Constitutional Court: Perspectives from the Federal Republic of Germany, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1862 (2006) (internal footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court of South Korea, 
however, must decide all appeals. Jin Yeong Chung & Sungjean Seo, Litigation and Enforcement in 
South Korea: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW, http://us.practicallaw.com/8-381-3681 (last updated Aug. 1, 
2015). Canada’s justices, however, have a level of discretion regarding certiorari comparable to the 
United States Supreme Court justices. See Benjamin Alarie & Andrew J. Green, Docket Control at the 
Supreme Court of Canada: What’s Behind the Screen? 3 (Chicago Law School Workshop on Judicial 
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the United States Courts of Appeals have to hear virtually every case 
appealed from the federal trial courts.233 Whereas twenty percent of 
the cases heard by the Supreme Court of Canada come to the justices 
through mandatory jurisdiction,234 our Supreme Court, by contrast, 
almost never has to hear a case.235 
That our Supreme Court has virtually unfettered discretion to 
decide which cases it will hear suggests that the process for those 
decisions should be open and transparent. If the justices had little 
control over their docket, like most other courts, there would be less 
need to understand what factors go into the decision-making process. 
Because the Supreme Court decides whether to hear cases pursuant to 
vague and often unknowable criteria, subjective to each justice, 
however, the public should know as much as possible about that 
process. In truth, we know very little. 
B.   What We Do Not Know 
The most troubling aspect of the process through which the Court 
decides which cases to hear is that the Justices do not identify which 
of them voted to hear a case.236 Moreover, the Court has never 
explained why it keeps the votes on whether to grant a writ of 
certiorari secret from the American people.237 It is perhaps 
understandable why the Court would not disclose the votes for the 
7,500 or so cases the Court decides not to hear (given the 
administrative burden that it would place on the Court), but why not 
disclose such information for the seventy-five or so cases the Court 
does decide to hear? There are strong arguments that this information 
is important and relevant to public discussion. 
                                                                                                                 
Behavior, Draft Paper, Mar. 20, 2014) http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/alarie_docket_control.pdf 
(“There is a process by which justices not on the panel can object to decisions to grant or deny leave, but 
the decision is ultimately up to the three panel members.”). 
 233. Appeals, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-
cases/appeals (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
 234. Alarie & Green, supra note 232. 
 235. Supreme Court Procedures, supra note 215 
 236. Segall, supra note 5. 
 237. See id. 
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For example, it is well accepted that, prior to Justice Scalia’s 
death, Justice Kennedy was the all-important swing vote on the Court 
in most important areas of constitutional law including abortion and 
affirmative action.238 The conventional wisdom was that there were 
four conservative Justices on the Court both ready to end affirmative 
action on a national basis and to return the issue of abortion to the 
states, whereas there were four liberal votes to allow the states to use 
affirmative action but also to protect the right to choose from state 
prohibition.239 Numerous abortion and affirmative action cases were 
brought to the Court, and we have no idea how Justice Kennedy (or 
any other Justice) voted on the certiorari questions in any of them.240 
When the Court decided to hear the cases, knowing whether Kennedy 
was one of the four (or more) votes in favor of hearing the case might 
have been extremely relevant information to the parties and to the 
public.241 Lawyers litigate these important cases in the lower courts 
with an eye towards the swing Justices on the Court and write the 
briefs that are filed in the Supreme Court in the same way. Knowing 
which Justices wanted to hear a case that has been granted, and 
which did not, might provide valuable information for the lawyers 
and the parties. 
The public should also be able to trace the Justices’ certiorari votes 
over time to better hold these public officials accountable for their 
important governmental decisions. At the moment, the public can 
make statements about the Court as an institution and the cases it 
decides to hear, but we have no way of assessing the work of each 
individual Justice when it comes to their certiorari votes. That is 
contrary to how democracies and representative governments are 
supposed to work. 
Are there valid reasons why the Justices’ votes on the certiorari 
issue should be secret? What plausible justifications could there be 
                                                                                                                 
 238. Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed, With Kennedy as Swing Vote, High Court Could Veer Right, NAT’L 
LAW JOURNAL (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202738849712/OpEd-With-
Kennedy-as-Swing-Vote-High-Court-Could-Veer-Right?slreturn=20151110165057. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See Segall, supra note 5. 
 241. Id. 
43
Segall: Invisible Justices
Published by Reading Room, 2016
830 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
for prohibiting the public from knowing this information? The author 
of this article has asked many experts this question, and the answer 
seems only to be, “well it has always been that way.”242 That, of 
course, is not a good reason. 
Some might argue that, if the certiorari votes are disclosed, the 
public might mistake a vote to hear or not to hear a case as a strong 
indicator of that Justices’ views on the merits of that case. But even if 
that is likely to happen, the cure is more information about the 
process, not secret votes. As a general rule, the government is not 
allowed to hide relevant, truthful information from the American 
people simply because the information might be misinterpreted.243 In 
addition, disclosing the votes after the case is decided (not ideal but 
better) would solve that problem.244 
This aspect of the Court’s decision making, that they do not reveal 
which Justices vote to hear a granted case, symbolizes the entire 
problem this article tries to capture: there should be (and usually is) a 
strong presumption in our democratic society that government 
processes be open and transparent.245 When it comes to Congress and 
the president, there are strict disclosure requirements, including open-
records laws and televised proceedings, and when the elected 
branches want to keep secrets, we place the burden of proof on them 
to demonstrate the need for that secrecy.246 But with the Supreme 
Court, there seems to be an assumption of secrecy and anonymity. 
This presumption should be changed. The Justices perform an 
immensely important public duty that affects all Americans when 
they decide which cases to hear. Why should they cast this vote in 
secrecy with no accountability? 
                                                                                                                 
 242. Justice Stevens gave a talk at Georgia State College of Law in 2014 and said he had never 
considered in thirty-five years why the certiorari votes are secret but it was probably because “it has 
always been that way.” John Paul Stevens, Henry J. Miller Lecture, Question and Answer Session (Apr. 
16, 2014) (audio on file with Georgia State Law Library). 
 243. See Segall, supra note 5. 
 244. I thank Akhil Amar for that idea. 
 245. Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 15, 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 246. See, e.g., Kathy Bradley, Do You Feel the Sunshine? Government in the Sunshine Act: Its 
Objectives, Goals, and Effect on the FCC and You, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 473, 477 (1997). 
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Another troubling aspect of the certiorari process is the influential 
role the Justices’ law clerks play in the decisions. The certiorari pool, 
originally the idea of Justice Lewis F. Powell, was developed in 
1972, and divides all of the petitions for certiorari equally between 
the nine Justices.247 Rather than having nine clerks, one from each 
chamber, review a certiorari petition and write a memorandum with a 
recommendation, “one clerk prepares a [single] memorandum that is 
then circulated to all of the Justices participating in the pool.”248 
Today all but Justice Alito participate in the pool.249 With the help of 
these memos, the Justices decide which cases will be discussed in 
conference, and therefore, which may eventually be heard.250 The 
certiorari pool gives the clerks tremendous influence, transforming 
them from helpers and staffers to “active decision maker[s].”251 
Scholars have debated whether the certiorari pool process leads the 
Justices to grant fewer petitions than before the pool began, because 
young law clerks might be reluctant to suggest to their bosses that 
cases be heard.252 There is no question that the Court grants fewer 
petitions than it used to, but other factors may be at work. One of the 
problems with making any kind of general statement about the role of 
law clerks in the process is that we know little about their 
involvement other than the general scheme outlined here. We do not 
know how much deference the Justices give the certiorari memos, 
how each Justice uses the memos, or how often the Justices disregard 
or accept the recommendations in the memos. And, of course, the 
                                                                                                                 
 247. David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the Certiorari 
Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 953 (2007) (reviewing TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE 
PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006) and ARTEMUS WARD 
& DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (2006)). 
 248. Id. at 972. 
 249. Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom: The ‘Cert. Pool’, N. Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/washington/26memo.html?_r=0. 
 250. See id. 
 251. ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS 
AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 23 (2006). 
 252. See Stras, supra note 247, at 969–72. For example, Edward Lazaurs, a clerk for Justice 
Blackmun, recounted the anecdote that he “doubt[ed] the Court granted any cert[iorari] petitions 
because of something clerks did and, if some clerks did manage to bury a few cases along the way, the 
same issues, assuming they were worth the Court’s time, were sure to resurface.” Id. at 969–70. 
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Justices do not reveal who votes for or against granting the petition in 
any given case.253 
Given all of these uncertainties, all we can say is that the process 
through which the Court decides which cases to hear and which cases 
not to hear is opaque, non-transparent, and largely secret. The only 
real sources of information are the very few tales told by former law 
clerks and the occasional dissent from the Court’s denial of a 
petition. Given the importance of a decision whether or not the 
Justices will vote to hear a case, their votes, at least on the cases 
where they grant the petition, ought to be public and the Court should 
be forthcoming on the precise roles their law clerks play in the 
process. 
V.   THE JUSTICES’ OFFICIAL RECORDS 
It would seem obvious that any papers and other materials 
which are generated by persons on the public 
payroll . . . doing the government’s business, should belong 
to the government . . . It would seem further that any 
memoranda, tapes, and drafts generated in the production 
of such documents or other materials for the same reasons 
should also be the property of the United States. In short, if 
the government paid the cost of production of the papers or 
other materials they should belong to the government. 
   Federal Judge J. Skelly Wright254 
Partly because of the many ways that Supreme Court Justices are 
inaccessible during their official years on the Court, seeing their 
official papers is often the only way we can truly understand a 
Justice’s career and evaluate how she served the public. Our 
historical accounts of the Court are often greatly enriched when a 
Justice’s personal files are released to the public after they are no 
                                                                                                                 
 253. See Segall, supra note 5. 
 254. SUSAN LOW BLOCH, VICKI C. JACKSON & THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT: THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 1044 (2d ed. 2008). 
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longer on the bench. Unfortunately, the Justices more often than not 
deprive the American public of that information for generations, and 
sometimes forever. 
For example, shortly before the 1986–1987 Supreme Court term 
began, Justice Byron White, who had been on the Supreme Court for 
twenty-five years, came to work on the weekend and, with the help of 
law clerks, destroyed many of his official files.255 According to his 
biographer, they bought a shredding machine for that specific 
purpose.256 Several of the files lost to history were labeled “Miranda 
v. Arizona” the landmark Supreme Court case where the Justices 
ruled that criminal defendants have “the right to remain silent.”257 
One of his law clerks at the time reportedly remarked “I couldn’t 
believe how much history was going down the chute.”258 
Supreme Court Justices are government employees who make 
public decisions and are paid out of taxpayer funds. Yet, the Justices 
are under no legal obligation to maintain their records and files, 
compiled sometimes over many decades, for historical study and 
national record keeping.259 Whereas the president’s official papers 
are subject to detailed recording and safekeeping requirements 
pursuant to the Presidential Records Act,260 the Justices each have 
their own idiosyncratic policies regarding their official documents.261 
The result is that many important and official papers are often lost to 
history for extended and unnecessary periods of time and sometimes, 
as was the case with Justice White’s papers, forever.262 This is one 
more example of how the Justices are less transparent than other 
governmental officials, even the President of the United States. 
The Court retains records kept for every case including the 
transcripts and audio recordings of the oral arguments and the 
                                                                                                                 
 255. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN 
CULTURAL TREASURES 95 (1999). 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1678 (2013). 
 260. Presidential Records Ac of 1978t, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2012). This act mandates that all 
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 262. Id. at 1685. 
47
Segall: Invisible Justices
Published by Reading Room, 2016
834 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
briefs.263 But each Justice also compiles personal notes, draft 
opinions, memoranda, and communications with other Justices and 
their law clerks which are of vital historical and public significance 
but for which there are no official rules.264 In a comprehensive law 
review article, Professor Kathryn Watts detailed the history leading 
to the current state of affairs where the Justices have complete 
control over these records, and she proposed a few solutions to 
remedy the problem.265 I owe a great debt to Professor Watts for 
much of the information contained in this Part.266 
A.   The Justices’ Practices 
In 1993, shortly after Justice Thurgood Marshall’s papers were 
promptly released to the country only two years after his retirement 
(a rare occurrence), Congress held hearings to discuss whether there 
should be uniform procedures governing the maintenance and release 
of the papers of Supreme Court Justices.267 The hearing was 
prompted at least in part by several interesting and noteworthy 
bombshells in Marshall’s papers, such as the fact that the Court was 
once extremely close to reversing Roe v. Wade, and the concern that 
the untimely release of the papers could jeopardize the workings of 
the Court.268 After much study, however, Congress ended up taking 
no action leaving in place the current hodgepodge of procedures used 
by different Justices depending on their own personal 
predilections.269 
Justice Marshall made his papers public quickly and expeditiously, 
but he is certainly the exception. For example, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor gave her papers to the Library of Congress upon the 
                                                                                                                 
 263. Id. at 1674. 
 264. Id. at 1674–75. 
 265. See generally id. 
 266. Professor Watts covers the papers of both lower court judges and the justices in her fine paper. 
This Chapter only discusses the papers of the latter. 
 267. Watts, supra note 259, at 1670–71. 
 268. Id. at 1968. 
 269. Id. at 1690–91. Historically, the justices of the nineteenth century took little care to preserve 
their papers. This attitude may have been sparked to some extent by the great Chief Justice John 
Marshall who believed Court secrecy was of vital importance and left no personal records or papers 
behind him when he died. Id.at 1678, 1681. 
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conditions that they remain sealed until her death and that individual 
case files must remain closed “during the service of any justice who 
participated in the case.”270 Given that she served with Justice 
Clarence Thomas,271 who may well serve twenty to thirty more years, 
this means that valuable historical information might be sealed for at 
least a generation. Moreover, for much of her tenure on the Court, 
Justice O’Connor played the role of swing Justice.272 In areas like 
affirmative action, abortion, campaign finance reform, and the 
separation of church and state, she wrote key concurring decisions 
dictating the results in those cases.273 She also often negotiated and 
bargained with other Justices to change their minds in these most 
controversial areas of constitutional law.274 There is little possibility 
of having an accurate historical understanding of the relationships of 
the Justices during the twenty-six years she served on the bench 
without access to her papers. This failure makes it much more 
difficult for Court watchers and historians to have a satisfactory 
understanding of the many years where Justice O’Connor was a key 
player on the Supreme Court. 
Justice Felix Frankfurter once observed that, to understand the 
United States Supreme Court, it is necessary to know the “private 
rehearsals . . . behind the impenetrable draperies of judicial 
secrecy.”275 What a shame that Justice William Brennan, who served 
on the Supreme Court for thirty-four years, and was the liberal 
wing’s leader for most of that time, gave a single biographer 
exclusive access to his papers for almost twenty years.276 There is no 
plausible reason one person should be allowed exclusive access to the 
public papers of one of the most long-serving and influential 
Supreme Court Justices in our history. 
                                                                                                                 
 270. Id. at 1682 n.92. 
 271. Julie Graves Krishnaswami, Reflecting on Sandra Day O’Connor’s Jurisprudence Relating to 
Race and Education, 57 CATH. U.L. REV. 1099, 1110 n.20 (2008). 
 272. Id. at 1137. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See id. 
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 276. Watts, supra note 259, at 1683. 
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Numerous other Justices have been equally protective of their 
papers. Justice Souter’s papers are sealed for fifty years.277 Chief 
Justice Warren E. Burger’s papers were donated by his son to the 
College of William and Mary in 1996, but they cannot be opened 
until 2026.278 Given the Chief’s administrative responsibilities, and in 
light of how forcefully he often exercised those duties, we can only 
assume there is a treasure trove of interesting and enlightening 
information in those files that has little to do with the decision of 
actual cases. What a shame that court commentators, scholars, and 
reporters have been locked out of those papers. 
We do not know what kinds of policies concerning their records 
and papers the current Justices will leave behind (recently deceased 
Justice Scalia apparently left behind no preferences about what to do 
with his papers so his family will have to decide), but if history and 
prior practice are our guides, it is more than likely that many of them 
will adopt secretive rules for these vital historical materials. 
Moreover, under the current regime, the Justices may destroy any and 
all of their personal papers, memoranda, and e-mails. Something 
needs to be done to protect these valuable governmental records. 
B.   The Presidential Records Act 
Enacted in the wake of the Watergate controversy, the Presidential 
Records Act (PRA) establishes that the official papers of the 
president (and the vice-president) belong to the people of the United 
States, not the men or women who happen to hold the offices of the 
president and the vice-president.279 The law requires the archivist of 
the United States to take custody of the president’s papers after he 
leaves office.280 The president may destroy records with no 
“administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value, 
if . . . [he] obtains the views, in writing, of the Archivist concerning 
                                                                                                                 
 277. Tony Mauro, Souter Blocks Access to his Papers for Fifty Years, NAT’L L. J. (Aug. 26, 2009), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202433393342/Souter-blocks-access-to-his-papers-for-50-
years. 
 278. Watts, supra note 259, at 1684. 
 279. Id. at 1669, 1673; 44 U.S.C. § 2202 (2012). 
 280. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(f)(1) (2012). 
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the proposed disposal of such Presidential records.”281 The PRA also 
requires the president to take all practical steps to segregate personal 
records from official presidential materials.282 As far as public access 
is concerned, the PRA allows for public viewing of the presidential 
records through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) beginning 
five years after the president leaves office.283 
Mindful that the president’s documents may be politically 
sensitive or contain information that could damages the interests of 
the United States if improperly released, the PRA does not require 
disclosure of all presidential materials.284 Excluded for a period of 
twelve years from the required disclosure are materials that contain 
(1) sensitive foreign policy information, (2) personnel information 
relating to federal appointments, (3) information required by other 
statutes to remain secret (such as classified materials), (4) trade 
secrets or private commercial information, (5) confidential 
communications between the president and his advisers, and (6) 
private personal information the disclosure of which would constitute 
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.285 
The PRA is not a perfect statute and has led to litigation over its 
access and disclosure policies.286 In addition, President Bush delayed 
the release of many of President Reagan’s materials through a 
controversial Executive Order that President Obama repealed after 
taking Office.287 The point, however, is that Congress made a good 
faith effort to force the Executive Branch to take reasonable efforts to 
preserve its official records and also made clear that those records 
belonged to the public, not to the president. Congress should 
undertake a similar project with regard to the Supreme Court of the 
                                                                                                                 
 281. Id. at § 2203(c). 
 282. Id. at § 2201(3). 
 283. Id. at § 2204(b)(2). 
 284. Id. at § 2204(a). 
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 286. See, e.g., Am. Historical Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 516 F. Supp. 2d 90, 99 
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United States because the Justices do not seem to want to make their 
own rules regarding their official records. 
Some may argue that there are differences between the president 
and the Supreme Court that make disclosure of the Justices’ records 
harder to justify than disclosure of presidential materials. Most 
significantly, perhaps, the Justices are supposed to speak only 
through their written opinions while the president acts publicly much 
of the time.288 This difference, however, does not lead to the 
conclusion that the Justices’ papers should belong to them rather than 
the public; at most it suggests that the law should treat the Justices’ 
papers differently. That the Justices hold their offices for life might 
suggest the need for greater, not lesser, scrutiny of their official 
records after they leave office given that they do not need public 
approval to keep their jobs. 
In any event, as with presidential papers, the official records of the 
Justices are created, maintained, and used by governmental officials 
performing public tasks and therefore should belong to the public.289 
As Judge Carl McGowan of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit once remarked as to his papers: “I 
can’t see any reason why . . . law clerks’ memoranda to me, my 
memoranda to them, my memoranda to other judges on the case, 
draft opinions, and notes . . . all that kind of thing . . . what’s in that 
file . . . are [not] the property of the United States 
Government . . . .”290 
C.   The Solution 
In her comprehensive article on the need for legislation governing 
the disposition of the papers of the Justices, Professor Watts suggests 
that Congress legislatively decree that the papers of the Justices are 
public property, but then work with the Judicial Office of the United 
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States Courts to draft a statute governing the details of how those 
documents should be kept and then disclosed.291 
There are undoubtedly sensitive issues dealing with the details of 
any mandatory record-keeping and disclosure rules. These issues 
suggest the Justices themselves have significant input in the process. 
The law would have to provide for rules governing “what papers 
should be kept, where they should be deposited, and when they 
should be released,” among other complicated questions.292 Including 
the administrative arm of the Supreme Court in the drafting process 
could alleviate separation of powers concerns potentially arising from 
legislative efforts that dictate to the Justices how they must treat their 
official papers.293 Therefore, it would be critical (though not 
absolutely necessary) to have the Justices agree to these official rules 
and including them in the process from the beginning would be the 
best way to achieve that goal. 
The societal benefits flowing from the required disclosure of the 
Justices’ papers are easy to see. The increased transparency resulting 
from such disclosure would help students of the Court study the 
historical practices of the Justices, would allow for greater insights 
into the inner workings of the Court and the relationships among the 
Justices, would provide the public much better access to its highest 
Court, and would allow for greater evaluation of the Court’s work, 
which might translate into more meaningful public involvement in 
future confirmations. 
There are potential objections, however, to transferring the Court’s 
papers from the Justices to the public. Professor Watts lists four such 
objections in her article (1) possible “chilling effects,” (2) financial 
expense, (3) threats to judicial independence and the separation of 
powers, and (4) lack of federal regulation as to the Congress’s own 
papers and records.294 Although these objections should be addressed 
in any regulatory scheme dealing with the Justices’ records, they do 
not justify a failure to ensure public access to those records. 
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1.   Chilling Effects 
If Congress requires the Justices to maintain their official records 
for eventual public disclosure, would that have the effect of chilling 
how the Justices communicate to their staff, clerks, and other 
Justices, as well as their maintenance of internal notes and 
reflections? Predicting the future is always difficult, but it is unlikely 
that the Justices would dramatically alter practices for several 
reasons. 
First, under the current system in which the Justices have complete 
say over their own records, it is always a possibility that 
communications between chambers will someday be made public by 
one or more of the Justices.295 This possibility, however, has not 
seemed to affect inter-office memoranda.296 After all, Justice 
Marshall made his papers public two years after his death and the 
materials contained much information about the Justices sitting at the 
time; those disclosures, though controversial, did not cause the 
Justices to significantly change their practices.297 
Second, even as to those completely internal official notes, 
communications with law clerks, and draft opinions, the Justices 
have strong incentives to continue to create a written record of what 
happens inside their chambers. They may want to affect how history 
deals with their judicial records and they may want to make sure 
there is a strong written record in case of law clerk disclosures or 
other leaks to the media.298 Moreover, writing internal memoranda 
and draft decisions are such integral methods of the decision-making 
process of the Justices that it is hard to conceive that they would 
dramatically alter them because of the possibility of ultimate 
disclosure after they have left the bench. 
Third, the experience under the Presidential Records Act does not 
support the idea of a strong chilling effect.299 There is little or no 
evidence that forced disclosure has altered the way the Executive 
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Branch conducts most of it business.300 In any event, such 
speculations should not get in the way of requiring much needed 
transparency. If there indeed are unforeseen chilling effects, they can 
be addressed through administrative rules and further legislative 
action. 
2.   Financial Costs 
There is no doubt that there would be enormous expenses 
associated with preserving, sorting, and ensuring public access to the 
Justices’ papers. Even if those records were eventually stored in 
private facilities such as colleges and libraries that were willing to 
house them, there would still be great cost to the taxpayer. Can a 
price tag really be placed, however, on the historical value these 
materials would provide to the American people? 
The Supreme Court is currently the least transparent of the three 
branches of the federal government.301 The Justices almost never 
appear on television in their official capacities, they rarely talk about 
their work in a meaningful manner off the bench, and there are no 
requirements that any of their pre-decisional records or files be 
maintained for posterity. The only way we will ever have reasonable 
insight into how the Justices interact with each other and their law 
clerks is through their personal papers. And, without that 
information, there is no plausible way to truly and fully evaluate the 
role the individual Justices play in our political system. 
3.   Congress’s Failure to Regulate Itself 
Although Congress has declared the president’s papers to be public 
property and enacted legislation covering their maintenance and 
release for public inspection, not surprisingly, Congress has not taken 
the same step with respect to its own papers.302 Professor Watts raises 
the issue of whether Congress would look self-serving if it required 
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disclosure of the Court’s papers, as well as the president’s, while 
refusing to saddle its own members with similar rules.303 
This objection is easily answered. First, much of Congress’s work 
is already in the public eye. It holds public hearings, its proceedings 
are often televised, and there is a long and detailed legislative history 
for many of the laws Congress enacts.304 Thus, Congress is far and 
away already more transparent than the Supreme Court. 
Second, Congress does require that all the records of each 
congressional committee be transferred to the National Archives for 
preservation.305 
Third, and most importantly, Congress should address the issue of 
who owns the records of each individual member and enact rules 
governing public access to those materials. If requiring the Justices to 
grant access were to generate public pressure for Congress to pass 
similar rules for itself would be a positive development. 
4.   Separation of Powers 
Some may argue that Congress does not possess the power to force 
the Justices to make their papers public and that any rules regarding 
the Judicial Branch’s papers must come from the Justices themselves. 
This argument would be based on the traditional justifications for a 
robust separation of powers doctrine. In order to better preserve 
liberty, the founding fathers intended that each branch of government 
be independent and strong enough to guard against encroachments of 
the other two branches.306 As James Madison said, “The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in 
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the 
very definition of tyranny.”307 On this issue, Madison and Jefferson 
agreed, as reflected in this letter from the latter to the former: 
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The principle of the Constitution is that of a separation of 
Legislative, Executive and Judiciary functions, except in 
cases specified. If this principle be not expressed in direct 
terms, it is clearly the spirit of the Constitution, and it ought 
to be so commented and acted on by every friend of free 
government.308 
The question is whether Congress requiring the Supreme Court to 
maintain its official papers for later public inspection would 
contradict the separations of powers principles upon which our 
government is based. Interestingly, President Nixon made these very 
arguments to the Supreme Court when he challenged the 
constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act,309 a law passed prior to the PRA designed to deal 
exclusively with the papers of Richard Nixon.310 The law directed the 
General Services Administration (GSA) to take custody of over 42 
million pages of documents and 880 tape recordings generated by the 
Nixon Administration to ensure they would be available for public 
inspection.311 President Nixon fought the law making numerous 
constitutional challenges including that the law violated the 
separation of powers.312 He claimed that Congress could not delegate 
to the Administrator of General Services, someone who worked 
inside the Executive Branch, the final authority over the papers and 
recordings because such a delegation constituted “an impermissible 
interference by the Legislative Branch into matters inherently the 
business solely of the Executive Branch.”313 Nixon argued that the 
law also interfered with presidential privilege.314 
The Supreme Court rejected Nixon’s argument for three reasons. 
First, the Court observed that President Ford signed the law, 
                                                                                                                 
 308. 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE JEFFERSONIAN CYCLOPEDIA: A COLLECTION OF THE VIEWS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 194 (John P. Foley ed. 1900). 
 309. See generally Nixon v. Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 310. Id. at 431. 
 311. Id. at 430. 
 312. Id. at 439. 
 313. Id. at 440. 
 314. Id. at 339–40. 
57
Segall: Invisible Justices
Published by Reading Room, 2016
844 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:4 
President Carter’s Justice Department defended the law in federal 
court, and thus there was presidential approval of the law’s 
constitutionality.315 Second, the Court said that the separation of 
powers was helped, not harmed, by the law’s placement of 
responsibility over the president’s papers and recordings in an officer 
inside the Executive Branch because “it is clearly less intrusive to 
place custody and screening of the materials within the Executive 
Branch itself than to have Congress or some outside agency perform 
the screening function.”316 Third, the Court said that Nixon’s view of 
separation of powers was overly formalistic and rigid to the extent 
that he argued that the three branches of government had to be totally 
separate from each other in order for each branch to properly fulfill 
its assigned duties.317 The more appropriate test, the Court said, was 
“whether the Act . . . prevents the Executive Branch from 
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”318 Because the 
materials were kept inside the Executive Branch, and because the 
president was able to assert numerous privileges to their public 
disclosure if he deemed it necessary to the interests of the United 
States, the Court rejected Nixon’s claims that the law violated the 
separation of powers.319 
The Court’s decision in Nixon supports the idea that requiring the 
Justices to allow access to their official records would not violate the 
separation of powers as long as Congress required the Justices 
themselves or the Judicial Office of the United States Courts to play a 
prominent role in the maintenance, collection, and eventual display 
of the records. As Professor Watts suggests, the appropriate course 
would be for Congress to declare, as it did with the president’s 
records, that the official files of the Justices are public, not private 
property, but then require either the Justices themselves or the 
Judicial Office to promulgate rules and regulations governing how 
those files are kept, what privileges the justices may assert, and how 
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long they should be kept secret until the public is allowed access.320 
If Congress were to proceed in that manner, the law would not 
threaten the separation of powers and would not interfere with the 
Court’s constitutionally assigned duties.321 
Under current law, Supreme Court justices may destroy their 
official files for any and all reasons and may limit access to those 
materials to a privileged few for any period of time.322 As noted 
earlier, Chief Justice Burger, for example, retired almost thirty years 
ago and his records have still not been made public.323 There are 
many reasonable ways to go about ensuring the public has reasonable 
access to the Justices’ papers, but allowing each justice to make any 
and all (or no) rules governing that access makes no sense and greatly 
lessens the transparency of our highest Court. 
I am not suggesting that each and every paper and e-mail a justice 
writes is necessarily a matter of public concern or that these records 
should be made available immediately after a justice resigns or dies 
in office. There are legitimate concerns involving the confidentiality 
of these records such as whether other sitting Justices may be 
adversely affected by the disclosure of their communications with the 
retired or deceased justice.324 But there should be a legally required 
method of insuring the public access to the non-privileged records of 
the Justices after a reasonable period of time. In a perfect world, the 
Justices themselves would create such a system but there is 
absolutely no indication that they are willing to do so. Therefore, as it 
did with the president’s papers, Congress should work with the 
justices and the administrative arm of the Court and enact a law 
allowing the American people to have access to the official records 
of the Court generated in the course of the Justices’ taxpayer-paid 
official duties. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of the United States makes decisions which 
significantly affect the lives of all Americans. Whether states may 
prohibit abortions, whether cities may ban hand-guns, whether 
Congress may enact meaningful campaign finance reform, and 
whether thousands of colleges and universities may employ 
affirmative action, are just a very few of the important issues the 
Court has resolved over the last few years.325 How the Justices use 
their power of judicial review to alter, lessen, or grant the American 
people rights and responsibilities is not likely to change in the 
foreseeable future, but we should be able to observe the Court more 
clearly and hold it more accountable. It is well past time to shine a 
brighter light on the nine most important judges in the United States. 
The easiest transparency problem to solve is the Justices’ lack of 
visibility while they perform their official and public functions. 
Supreme Court oral arguments and decision days, already open to the 
public, should be available for the world to see and in real time. For 
present day citizenship moments, historical study and pride, and pure 
democratic accountability, the Court needs to join the majority of 
American states and numerous other countries, such as Canada and 
the United Kingdom, and allow television cameras in their 
courtroom. Our next generation of lawyers, public servants, and 
citizens deserve nothing less. There is no good reason that the video 
of dramatic moments in American history, such as Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s announcement in 2015 that millions of gays and lesbians 
across the United States have the constitutional right to marry, should 
be lost forever. 
Supreme Court Justices are the only federal judges in the country 
not bound by a code of ethics.326 Each individual Justice has the final 
say over whether she will recuse herself over a potential or actual 
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conflict of interest.327 The Justices should be bound by the same 
ethics and recusal constraints that all other judges must abide by. If 
anything, the Justices should be more, not less, transparent than 
lower court federal judges.  
Every year, lawyers file more than 7,500 petitions for certiorari 
and only 70–80 are accepted by the Justices.328 Many of those 
requests raise serious legal issues and significant time, energy, and 
money are poured into the briefs. Yet, there is no official record of 
which Justices voted to hear which cases, and there is no formal way 
to understand a Justices’ certiorari votes over time.329 When 
historians try to evaluate a Justices’ thirty years on the bench, how 
the Justice voted on which cases to hear is vitally important. There is 
no legitimate reason why we should be denied this true and relevant 
information about important governmental choices. 
For many of the reasons discussed in this article, Supreme Court 
Justices are far removed from the people they are supposed to serve. 
Even after the Justices retire or die, this lack of transparency 
continues to an alarming degree.330 To cite just one of many 
examples, the official tax-payer funded official records of Chief 
Justice Burger, who left the Court in 1986, are still invisible to the 
American public, and will remain so for many more years.331 We 
have a law declaring that the President’s official records belong to 
the public and requiring the National Archives to organize them (take 
out all privileged material) and make them available to the people a 
reasonable time after a President leaves offices.332 Congress should 
work with the Administrative Office of the Supreme Court, and the 
Justices themselves, and enact a similar open-records law so that we 
have a more accurate understanding of how our Supreme Court 
operates over time. 
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Most importantly, the Supreme Court ought to embrace the same 
democratic presumption of openness and transparency that we take 
for granted with the other branches of government. Unless national 
security, foreign policy sensitive materials, or private personnel 
matters are at issue, we expect the elected branches to open their 
doors and records to reasonable public inspection. When the elected 
branches want to keep records or proceedings secret, they bear the 
heavy burden of demonstrating the need for that secrecy. But when it 
comes to the Supreme Court, there appears to be an exactly opposite 
presumption. Whether it is the lack of cameras, the anonymity of the 
certiorari votes, the refusal of the Justices to abide by the same 
ethical and recusal rules as other judges, or the lack of any rules 
regarding their official papers, the story of the Supreme Court is one 
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